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ABSTRACT
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EXAMINATION OF SURF-IA ALERTING FOR RUNWAY INCURSION
INCIDENTS
Institution: Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Degree: Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation
Year: 2013
New flight deck technology designed to mitigate runway incursions may not be effective
in triggering a flight deck alert to avoid high speed surface collisions for runway
incursions classified as serious by legacy metrics. This study demonstrated an innovative
method of utilizing expert raters and actual high-risk incidents to identify shortcomings
of using legacy metrics to measure the effectiveness of new technology designed to
mitigate hazardous incidents. Expert raters were used to validate the Enhanced Traffic
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA)
model for providing alerts to pilots to reduce the occurrence of pilot deviation type
runway incursion incidents categorized as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO
Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) model.
This study used archival data from Aviation Safety Information Analysis and
Sharing (ASIAS) incident reports and video reenactments developed by the FAA Office
of Runway Safety. Two expert raters reviewed nine pilot deviation type serious runway
incursion incidents. The raters applied the baseline minimally compliant implementation
of the RTCA/DO 323 SURF-IA model to determine which incidents would have an
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alerting SURF-IA outcome. Inter-rater reliability was determined by percentage
agreement and Cohen’s kappa and indicated perfect agreement between the raters who
assessed six of the incidents with a SURF-IA alerting outcome and three as non-alerting.
Specific aircraft states were identified in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all pilot deviation type runway incursion
incidents classified as serious by the FAA/ICAO RISC model: (a) wrong runway
departures, (b) no alert if traffic entered runway after ownship lift-off from same runway,
and (c) helicopter operations.
The study concluded that the SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a
Warning or Caution alert for all pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents classified
as serious by the FAA/ICAO RISC model. Even if the SURF-IA model had performed
to design, the best it could have achieved would have been a 70% alerting outcome for
incidents classified as serious by the legacy RISC model metric. In the qualitative
analysis both raters indicated that neither the legacy RISC definition of on-runway nor
the SURF-IA definition was appropriate. Hence, the raters’ recommendation was not to
adopt either model’s definition, but rather develop an entirely new definition through
further study. The raters were explicit about the criticality of appropriate and harmonized
definitions used in the models.
The different outcomes between the RISC and SURF-IA models may result in
misleading information when using the reduction in serious runway incursion incidents
as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA technology. It is recommended that prior to using
the ASIAS runway incursion data as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA, the FAA
develop a process for identifying and tracking ASIAS reported PD type serious runway
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incursion incidents which will not trigger a SURF-IA alert. Consideration should be
made to improving the SURF-IA model technical capabilities to accommodate all
possible aircraft states that the RISC model would classify as serious runway incursion
incidents.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) predicts that domestic passenger
capacity will grow from 731 million in Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 to 1.2 billion in FY 2032
(FAA, 2011a). To accommodate the demand for additional capacity in a safe and
efficient manner, the FAA has implemented the Next Generation Air Transportation
System (NextGen). NextGen is a comprehensive overhaul of the National Airspace
System (NAS) that integrates new and existing communication, navigation, and
surveillance technologies. The cornerstone enabling technology to accommodate the
growth in the number and frequency of aircraft operations, both in the air and on the
ground, will be a satellite-based navigation and surveillance system that implements
various applications of Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) (FAA,
2011b, 2012a, 2012b).
The FAA forecasts that airport tower operations associated with the increased
domestic capacity will increase by 23% between FY 2012 and FY 2032, which
corresponds to an increased number of runway operations (FAA, 2011a). As a proactive
measure for mitigating runway incursions, in 2011 the FAA issued Advisory Circular
(AC) 20-172 -Airworthiness Approval for ADS-B(In) Systems and Applications, which
included Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications
and Alerts (SURF-IA) as one of the NextGen ADS-B(In) applications (FAA, 2011b).
The deadliest accident in worldwide aviation history occurred on March 27, 1977,
and involved a runway incursion and collision of two B-747 aircraft at Tenerife in the
Canary Islands resulting in 583 fatalities (http://www.ntsb.gov/safety/mwl-4.html). Since
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1990, there have been seven fatal runway incursion accidents in the United States
resulting in 112 fatalities, the deadliest of which occurred in 2006 with 49 fatalities
(Table 1) (NTSB, 2007).

Table 1
Fatal U.S. runway incursion accidents 1990-2012
Year
2006
2000
1996

Location
Lexington, KY
Sarasota, FL
Quincy, IL

Airline/Flight
Aircraft
Fatalities
Comair 5191
CL-600
49
N89827/N79960 C-152, C-172
4
United Express Beech 1900, King 14
5925/N1127D
Air A90
1994 St. Louis, MO
TWA
MD 82, C441
2
427/N441KM
1991 Los Angeles, CA
USAir 1493/
B-737, Metroliner 34
SkyWest 5569
1990 Detroit, MI
NWA
DC-9, B-727
8
1482/NWA 299
1990 Atlanta, GA
EAL
B-727, King Air
1
111/N44UE
A100
Note: Adapted from the NTSB database website
http://www.ntsb.gov/aviationquery/index.aspx and ALPA website
http://www.alpa.org/portals/alpa/runwaysafety/NTSBRunwaySafetyfact sheet.pdf

On June 30, 2010, the FAA chartered an Aviation Rulemaking Committee (ARC)
for ADS-B(In) that recommended the implementation of SURF-IA to mitigate runway
incursions as one of the top ten ADS-B(In) priorities to support NextGen (ADS-B, 2011).
SURF-IA is a new avionics system that alerts pilots of potentially dangerous runway
incursions. Runway incursions are defined by the FAA and International Civil Aviation
Organization (ICAO) as the incorrect presence of an aircraft on a surface designated for
takeoff and landing, and are grouped into three types: (a) operational error/ deviation/
incident (OE/D/I), (b) vehicle-pedestrian deviation (V/PD), and (c) pilot deviation (PD)
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(FAA, 2009; ICAO, 2007). For over two decades the FAA has used the rate and number
of runway incursions as a metric for measuring runway safety; however, there has not
been a significant reduction in runway incursions. The ADS-B(In) ARC proposed using
the change in rate of PD type runway incursions as the FAA metric for assessing the
benefit and effectiveness of SURF-IA flight deck technology as a mitigation for runway
incursions (ADS-B, 2011). Pilot deviation type runway incursions comprised over 60%
of all runway incursions, which are the type of runway incursion that SURF-IA was
designed to mitigate. The FAA Office of Runway Safety tracks and classifies runway
incursions using a Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) model (FAA, 2006,
August). However, the RISC model used by the FAA for classification of a runway
incursion differs from the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA)
developed model used to activate SURF-IA flight deck alerts of a runway incursion that
will be displayed to pilots (Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan, & Davis, 2005; FAA, 2007a;
RTCA, 2010). When introducing new technology, the FAA often utilizes international
consensus organizations, such as RTCA and the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE),
to develop specifications, requirements, and standards, which the FAA then adopts in part
or in toto as regulatory guidance.
This study evaluated the effectiveness of the SURF-IA model for providing alerts
to pilots to reduce the occurrence of PD type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion
incidents as defined by the RISC model. Quantitative data were used to identify the state
of ownship (vernacular for pilot’s own aircraft) and traffic aircraft for incidents when the
outcome severity of the SURF-IA model was not validated by matching the outcome
severity of the RISC model. Qualitative data were used to describe specific aircraft
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states and factors in the models. The aircraft states were defined by the true position of
ownship and traffic aircraft in the runway environment. The practical findings of this
study may be used to:
(a) specify recommendations for modifications that may enhance the SURF-IA and RISC
models, and (b) utilize the modifications to enhance validation of metrics for measuring
the benefits of SURF-IA technology. Furthermore, the implications of this study’s
approach, which assessed the validity of using legacy metrics to measure the
effectiveness of new flight deck technology, can be applied to other emerging NextGen
flight deck technology that have measurable operational outcomes. Traditional or legacy
metrics that have been historically used to assess existing technology may have little or
no meaning for the models and algorithms utilized in new technology. For example,
Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts (TSAA) is another NextGen technology that will
enhance safety in general aviation (GA) aircraft by providing flight deck alerts to
mitigate aircraft mid-air collisions (FAA, 2012a). The FAA (2012c) defines a Near MidAir Collision (NMAC) as an incident associated with the operation of an aircraft in which
the possibility of collision has been reported by one of the involved flight crew, and
results in a recorded proximity of less than 500 feet vertical and 0.5 nautical miles lateral
to another aircraft. The effectiveness of TSAA technology will likely be measured
through NMAC reports, which are tracked through the Aviation Safety Information and
Analysis System (ASIAS); however, the algorithm that triggers flight deck alerts for the
proposed TSAA system may have a model with different aircraft proximity thresholds.
Hence, an aircraft with TSAA on a flight deck display may be presented with information
that safe separation was maintained from another aircraft, but may still precipitate a
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NMAC report from the other traffic. This study provided a methodological framework
for evaluating legacy metrics to ensure they present valid indications of the safety
performance of new technology. The methodology can be extended to other
transportation modes as well as medicine, law enforcement, nuclear power-plants, and
other safety critical fields.
Runway Incursion Defined
In October 2007, the FAA adopted the ICAO definition of runway incursion as
any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an aircraft, vehicle,
or person on the protected area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of
aircraft. The revised definition expanded the legacy FAA definition to include surface
incidents and wrong runway departures. In addition, the revised definition changed some
of the descriptors for the categories and types of runway incursions (Figure 1) (FAA,
2009).

Figure 1. FAA definition of runway incursion severity classifications. Adapted from the
“National Runway Safety Plan 2009-2011,” by the FAA, 2009.
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Runway incursions are only reported and tracked by the FAA Office of Runway
Safety at airports that have an operating air traffic control tower (FAA, 2009). The FAA
defines Category A and Category B runway incursions as serious incidents.
Runway Incursion Statistics
FAA runway incursion data for FY 2008 through FY 2012 indicate that there has
been an increase in the rate and the number of runway incursions (Figures 2 and 3).
Although there have been other types of aviation related accidents and incidents on the
runway surface, such as runway excursions and loss of control (LOC) on the ground, both
the FAA and the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) consider runway
incursions as the top surface hazard (FAA, 2012b; NTSB, 2012).
The most prevalent type of runway incursion was caused by a pilot deviation,
defined by the Flight Standards Information Management System (FSMIS) as actions of a
pilot that resulted in a failure to comply with air traffic control (ATC) clearance and/or
instructions (Figure 2). The overall rate of runway incursions per million operations from
FY 2008 to FY 2012 increased from 17.16 to 21.02, of which over 60% were PD type in
every year (Figure 3). Pilot deviation type runway incursions are the type of runway
incursions intended to be mitigated by SURF-IA.
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Figure 2. Runway incursions FY 2008-FY 2012. Adapted from http://www.faa.gov/
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Benefits of Runway Incursion Mitigation
Aviation rulemaking committees, which are chartered by the FAA, conduct
benefit-cost analyses as part of their evaluations of investments in new technology that
are subject to FAA decision-making, such as SURF-IA (FAA, 2007b). All costs incurred
(or costs avoided) that may result from proposed FAA investments and regulations are
considered in the analyses. Avoided accidents are one of the principal benefits and are
valued using the avoided injury and property damage costs recommended in the FAA
Guide for Economic Values for FAA Investment and Regulatory Decisions (FAA,
2007b). Accurately quantifying benefits of SURF-IA in terms of avoidance of hull loss
and fatalities is difficult because, fortunately, there have been few actual runway
incursion accidents. However, the ADS-B(In) ARC report estimated the benefits from
avoidance of runway incursions from FY 2011-FY 2025 to be $55M for the U.S.
domestic air transport community alone (ADS-B, 2011).

Risk management in aviation illustrates how organizations cooperate, by
capturing near miss information to augment the sparse history of crashes and
injuries. Data from incident reporting systems on near misses have been
effectively used to redesign aircraft, air traffic control systems, airports, and pilot
training, and to reduce human error (Barach & Small, 2000, p. 762).

Considering Category A and Category B runway incursion incidents, and not just
accidents in the benefit analysis for SURF-IA, would follow historical precedents such as
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the mandate for Collision Avoidance System (CAS), which considered mid-air collision
(MAC) accidents along with near mid-air collision incidents.
The language in the economic analysis in the rulemaking for CAS demonstrated
the precedent for using incident data to supplement accident data for the benefit analysis
of new flight deck technology (Collision Avoidance Systems, 2003).

It is assumed that the risk of a near mid-air collision (NMAC) is proportional to
the pair probabilities. The risk of a NMAC is used rather than the risk of a MAC,
because most of the statistical models used in studying the safety of TCAS II
were derived from encounter data and not from MAC data. (CAS, 2003, p.15896)

Based in part on the Collision Avoidance System (2003) precedent, the ADSB(In) ARC report recommended measuring reduced frequency of pilot deviation type
runway incursion incidents associated with the use of SURF-IA flight deck technology,
to assess the effectiveness and benefit of the new technology (ADS-B, 2011).

The ARC recommends the FAA analyze the rate of pilot deviation type runway
incursions at the 44 airports where the SURF-IA ADS-B(In) application is
initially implemented to assess the application’s benefits. (ADS-B, 2011, p. 45)

SURF-IA Model
The SURF-IA Safety and Performance Interoperability Requirements (SPR) were
developed through the Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA) Special
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Committee 186 (SC-186) based on studies by Jones and Prinzel (2006), and Prinzel and
Jones (2006). Using ADS-B technology, SURF-IA mitigates runway incursions by
enhancing pilot situation awareness of other aircraft through a Cockpit Display of Traffic
Information (CDTI) (Jones & Prinzel, 2006; Jones, Prinzel, Otero, & Barker, 2009;
Moertl & Nickum, 2008; Prinzel & Jones, 2006). SURF-IA technology, enabled by
ADS-B(In), was designed for use by pilots operating within the airport surface movement
area.
Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast is the FAA's satellite-based
successor to radar. ADS-B makes use of Global Positioning System (GPS) technology to
determine and share precise aircraft location information, and streams additional flight
information to the flight deck of properly equipped aircraft. It is automatic because no
interrogation from an external source is required for operation, and it is dependent
because it relies on on-board equipment to provide surveillance information (i.e.,
position, altitude, speed, and heading) obtained from a GPS receiver (RTCA, 2010). Any
user within line-of-sight broadcast range can receive and process ADS-B messages using
an appropriate receiver. The CDTI is enhanced with SURF-IA visual alerts, aural alerts,
and indications that highlight traffic and runway status through alphanumeric information
and symbology (Figure 4) (Jones & Prinzel, 2006; Jones, Prinzel, Otero, & Barker, 2009;
Jones et al., 2010; RTCA, 2010).
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Figure 4. Conceptual cockpit display of a Warning alert from SURF-IA. Adapted from
“Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),”
by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323).

The starting point for the Minimum Operational Performance Standards (MOPS)
of the model for SURF-IA alerting are set forth in the Safety and Performance
Interoperability Requirements (SPR) Document developed by RTCA (2010). The SPR
identified the baseline SURF-IA model as the version with limitations to the technical
capabilities for
•

alerting and indications about potential collisions in airport ramp areas;
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•

alerting and indications about potential collisions on airport taxiways;

•

technological integration between ground-based alerting logic and flight deck
based alerting logic;

•

SURF-IA for helicopters;

•

SURF-IA for ground vehicles;

•

explicit consideration of aircraft movement intent information. This version
inferred movement intent based on current traffic position and movement (e.g.,
takeoff, landing, crossing);

•

detection of wrong runway usage (including closed runways), unless there is
conflicting traffic;

•

alerting after lift-off;

•

use of CDTI and indications for surface movement efficiency, such as supporting
taxi-operations during low visibility conditions;

•

directive alerting;

•

predictive alerting.

Runway Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) Model
The RISC model was based on the research conducted by Sheridan (2004),
Sheridan, Cardosi, and Hannon (2004), and Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan, and Davis
(2005). It has been used since 2006 by the FAA Office of Runway Safety as part of its
quality management system (QMS) to validate runway incursion severity classifications
(FAA, 2006, August; FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March). A computer program
that automated the RISC model was developed by the FAA and VOLPE National
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Transportation System Center with the aim of standardizing assessments of runway
incursion events among the FAA and ICAO member states (ICAO, 2007). The primary
factors considered in the RISC model were horizontal/vertical proximity of the aircraft
and/or vehicle/pedestrian, geometry of the encounter, evasive or corrective action,
available reaction time, environmental conditions, and factors that affected system
performance such as communication failures/errors (Figure 5).

Figure 5. Runway Incursion Severity Classification calculator. Adapted from the
“Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions,” by ICAO, 2007.

The RISC model was initially developed from research conducted by Sheridan, Cardosi,
and Hannon (2004) for rating the severity of close-call events in transportation, medicine,
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police, and security, and then refined by Sheridan (2004) and Cardosi, Hannon, Sheridan,
and Davis (2005) to specifically focus on runway incursions.
The ICAO (2007) Manual on the Prevention of Runway Incursions cited Sheridan
(2004) as the governing document that provided the mathematics behind the RISC model
for objectively categorizing runway incursion incidents as Category A, B, or C.
Sheridan’s (2004) so-called interpolation method for rating severity of runway incursions
established a priori criteria and rules for the RISC model based on the objective factual
data and quantitative estimates extracted from ATC runway incursion reports used by the
FAA Office of Runway Safety to classify incidents. The model identified a set of
independent runway incursion scenarios (e.g., one landing aircraft, one taxiing aircraft)
that broadly subsumed all incursions. The baseline severity was determined by closest
horizontal or vertical proximity for the given scenario. A smaller set of common scalable
factors (e.g., visibility, ceiling, Runway Visual Range (RVR), day/night) rated on a 10point scale were used to further characterize the severity of the scenario beyond aircraft
proximity. For cases where the scalable factors were all zero, closest proximity alone
was adequate to characterize the severity of the incident. Each factor’s weighted score
was used to calculate a final score that determined the severity category. The Runway
Incursion Severity Classification (RISC) calculator is a computer program that classifies
the outcome of runway incursions into one of three severity categories: “A”, “B”, or “C”.
Category D runway incursions are considered non-conflicting (Figure 1). The calculator
was populated with data extracted from pilot deviation reports (FAA Form 8020-17) of
runway incursions submitted by the ATC personnel who observed the incident (FAA,
2007a, 2007c, 2010a).
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In the initial RISC validation, the model ratings matched the ratings from the
FAA Office of Runway Safety in only 67% of the cases. Hence, Cardosi, Hannon,
Sheridan, and Davis (2005) recommended the incorporation of the following
improvements to the RISC model prior to formal implementation by the FAA and ICAO:
(a) only consider closest proximity achieved unintentionally; (b) not consider an incident
where ATC directed participating aircraft to intentionally and knowingly taxi toward
each other on the same runway; and (c) classify aircraft fly-over or land-over scenarios as
Category B instead of Category C.
Following the aforementioned model adjustments, the FAA (2006, August)
assessed the RISC as valid and reliable and formalized its use by the FAA Office of
Runway Safety Quality Management System (QMS) process for runway incursion
severity classification (FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March). The International
Civil Aviation Organization (2007) also formalized the use of the Runway Incursion
Severity Classification (RISC) computer program for modeling and standardizing the
classification of outcomes from runway incursions to provide consistent ratings by
applying the same decision processes used by expert raters from the FAA and ICAO
(FAA, 2006, August; FAA, 2011a, March; FAA, 2011b, March; ICAO, 2007). ICAO
asserted that, “such consistency is deemed essential for being able to examine trends over
time or see the effects of mitigation strategies” (ICAO, 2007, p. H-1).
RISC and SURF-IA Model Comparison
The RISC model was based primarily on aircraft state, environmental factors, and
non-temporal quantitative factors for closest horizontal or vertical (overflight) proximity
and could consider ATC intervention for intentional incursions. The SURF-IA model for
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alerts relied on GPS derived quantitative aircraft state factors that considered horizontal
and vertical proximity as well as temporal closure considerations. However, the
proximity information entered into the RISC model from ATC deviation reports at times
was based on subjective observations of incidents with regard to how close two aircraft
came to colliding, rather than the precise GPS derived instrument readings for position
and time that were used in SURF-IA (GAO, 2007). An overview of the primary model
factors is provided in Table 2.

Table 2
Comparison of primary model factors for RISC and SURF-IA
Factors for Model
Horizontal Separation

FAA RISC Model
√

SURF-IA Alerts Model
√

Vertical Separation

√

√

Aircraft Geometry

√

√

Runway Visual Range

√

×

Ceiling/Visibility

√

×

Braking Condition

√

×

Closure Rate

×

√

Day/Night

√

×

VMC/IMC

√

×

Aircraft Size

√

×

Aircraft Maneuver

√

√

Human Errors

√

×

ATC Intervention

√

×

Hold Short Line

Runway Shoulder

< 1 mile from runway threshold

≤ 35 secs to runway
threshold

On-Runway Criteria
Distance from Runway

√ Considered
× Not considered
Note: Adapted from “Safety, performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic
situational awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA), 2010, and “A method for rating the severity of runway incursions,”
by Cardosi, et al., Proceedings of the USA/Europe 6th Air Traffic Management Research and Development
Seminar, 2005.
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Other comparisons between SURF-IA alerting model and the RISC model for a
serious (Category A or Category B) classification that could affect the outcomes were as
follows:
1)

SURF-IA model will alert when conflicting aircraft is within 35
seconds of the runway threshold (RTHRE), while the RISC model
considers traffic at less than one nautical mile (nm) from the runway
threshold as a serious runway incursion.

2)

Even when a take-off clearance was cancelled by ATC, SURF-IA will
alert when conflicting traffic was on the same runway with either
aircraft moving at greater than 40 knots with closure. The RISC model
accounted for air traffic controller instructions and interventions.

3)

SURF-IA will alert for any conflicting traffic operating below 1000
feet above the airfield elevation (AFE) with horizontal and/or vertical
closure, while the RISC model for a serious incident typically requires
less than 4000 feet horizontal separation or less than 100 feet vertical
overflight separation.

4)

The SURF-IA model defined an on-runway condition for an aircraft
not lined up with the runway as any part of the aircraft inside the
runway shoulder. The SURF-IA model also considered an aircraft to
have met the on-runway condition when it was approximately lined-up
with the runway and was within one runway width of the runway
centerline (Figure 6). However, the FAA (2010a) Runway Safety
Program and the RISC model defined an on-runway condition to be

18
when any part of the aircraft was inside the runway hold position
markings (i.e., hold line), which was encompassed by the runway
safety area (RSA). A comparative depiction of the on-runway
condition for the SURF-IA model and RISC model is provided in
Figure 7 (FAA, 1989, 2010a; RTCA, 2010).

Figure 6. SURF-IA on-runway conditions. Adapted from “Safety, performance and
interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational awareness on the
airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA, 2010.
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SURF-IA “On
Runway” point

FAA Order 7050.1A
and RISC Model “On
Runway” point

Figure 7. U.S. airport surface geometry on-runway points. Adapted from “Safety,
performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational
awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA,
2010, “Runway Safety Program,” by FAA, 2010.“Airport Design,” by FAA, 1989.

Statement of the Problem
The SURF-IA model may not trigger a flight deck Warning or Caution alert to
prompt pilot action for pilot deviation type runway incursions classified by the
FAA/ICAO RISC model as serious (Category A or Category B) to avoid a potential high
speed surface collision between two aircraft.

Purpose Statement
The purpose of this study was to use actual runway incursion incidents to validate
the SURF-IA model for providing alerts to pilots to reduce the occurrence of pilot
deviation type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents as defined by the
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RISC model. The study used two expert raters to determine if the SURF-IA model would
have provided an alert for the scenarios from archived historical ASIAS reports of pilot
deviation type runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the
RISC model.

Research Questions
Does the SURF-IA model yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for
runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO
RISC model? What are the aircraft states in the SURF-IA model that preclude an
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as
serious (Category A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model?

Significance of the Study
For over a decade, the reduction of runway incursions has been a top strategic
objective for the FAA and also identified as one of aviation’s most critical continuing
challenges by the National Transportation Safety Board, European Aviation Safety
Agency (EASA), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (EASA, 2010; FAA,
2012b; ICAO, 2007; NTSB, 2012). From FY 2005-FY 2010 over 60% of runway
incursions were from pilot deviations (FAA, 2009, 2011c). The FAA opens an
enforcement investigation upon receipt of a pilot deviation report (FAA Form 8020-17)
for a runway incursion that involves possible regulatory violations (FAA, 2007a, 2007c,
2010a). If the investigation reveals a violation of an FAA regulation, the pilot may be
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subject to legal enforcement action such as pilot certificate action or civil penalty (FAA,
2007c, 2010a, 2010c).
One of the NextGen technological mitigations for runway incursions will be flight
deck alerts using SURF-IA. The metric to measure the benefit of SURF-IA as a runway
incursion mitigation strategy will be assessed by the FAA Office of Runway Safety
through analysis of statistics for change in the rate of pilot deviation type runway
incursions using the legacy RISC criteria (ADS-B, 2011). Different outcome severities
from the RISC and SURF-IA models, when applied to the same runway incursion
incident, may result in misleading information when using the reduction in runway
incursion incidents classified as serious by the RISC model as the metric for assessing the
effectiveness and benefit of SURF-IA technology. The outcome differences may also
result in a pilot not receiving a Warning or Caution alert from the SURF-IA flight deck
technology for an event that would be categorized and reportable to the FAA by the RISC
model as a serious runway incursion, and may result in legal disputes over FAA
enforcement actions for runway incursions from pilot deviations (OSC, 2008).

Delimitations
Only pilot deviation (PD) type runway incursion incidents of Category A and
Category B that occurred in the United States between FY 2007-FY 2012 for which the
FAA Office of Runway Safety created video-reenactments were considered in this study.
The SURF-IA logic for this study only considered alerts and did not include or consider
SURF-IA indications. Hence, the raters only rated whether or not a SURF-IA alert
would have been triggered, without considering whether or not a runway incursion would
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have been avoided. The study did not evaluate the physical location of the SURF-IA
alert annunciation on the CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional
accuracy, or aircraft deceleration/braking performance.
For the SURF-IA model, any incident that would have triggered an alert
(Warning or Caution) was coded as an alerting incident and considered equivalent to a
Category A or Category B serious runway incursion from the RISC model. Any other
outcome was coded as a non-alerting incident, hence not a serious incident. OE/D/I
incidents were used in the pilot study as surrogates for PD type incidents in order to
maximize the number of PD type incidents available for the main study.

Limitations and Assumptions
This analysis assumed that the flight deck SURF-IA alerting system assessed in
this study complied with the baseline minimum performance requirements stipulated in
the Safety, Performance, and Interoperability Requirements (SPR) Document RTCA/DO
323 developed by RTCA (2010) with the known limitations as published in the SPR
(Table 3). The FAA conducted a study on the risk mitigation related to ADS-B surface
detection performance issues in support of future ADS-B surface applications such as
SURF-IA, and identified necessary improvements to the airport ground infrastructure to
resolve operational SURF-IA issues (FAA, 2012d). As of 2012, the FAA had identified
44 airports already outfitted or in the process of being equipped with the necessary
ground infrastructure to resolve the operational SURF-IA issues of multi-path, drop-outs,
line-of-sight, and position accuracy on the ground (FAA, 2012a, 2012d). This study
assumed that the airports where the incidents occurred had the overall infrastructure
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necessary to support aircraft operating with minimally compliant SURF-IA systems that
would alert per RTCA/DO-323.

Table 3
Capabilities not in baseline SURF-IA
Alerting and indications about potential collisions in airport ramp areas
Alerting and indications about potential collisions on airport taxiways
Technological integration between ground-based alerting logic and flight deck based
alerting logic
SURF IA for helicopters
SURF IA for ground vehicle
Explicit consideration of aircraft movement intent information. This version inferred
movement intent based on current traffic position and movement (e.g., take-off,
landing, crossing)
Detection of wrong runway usage (including closed runways) in absence of a conflict
traffic
Alerting after lift-off
Use of CDTI and indications for surface movement efficiency such as supporting taxioperations during low visibility conditions
Directive alerting
Predictive alerting
Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document
for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and
Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323),
2010.

By definition, a runway incursion incident classified as serious (Category A or B)
required an immediate or time critical response by the pilot in either aircraft, which is
analogous to SURF-IA alerts (Warning or Caution) that also require a similar pilot
response as shown in Table 4. In the event a runway incursion is in progress, or about to
occur, incursion detection and aural/graphical alerting on the flight deck by the SURF-IA
model allows evasive or corrective action to be taken immediately (Green, 2006). Hence,
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it was assumed that a serious (Category A or Category B) runway incursion outcome
from the RISC model was equivalent, in terms of potential outcome severity, to a SURFIA alert outcome. The model for SURF-IA used the 14CFR §25.1322 definition of an
alert, modified to only consider Warnings and Cautions and not Advisories (FAA, 2010b,
RTCA, 2010). During the development of the SURF-IA model, Jones and Prinzel (2006)
mapped Category A and Category B serious runway incursion incidents to SURF-IA
alerts, which was consistent with the U.S.C. 14CFR §25.1322 and associated FAA
(2010b) Advisory Circular definition for a Warning or Caution alert (Table 4). Whereas
the FAA (2010b) defined three possible levels of alerting (Warning, Caution, and
Advisory), SURF-IA alerts only considered Warnings and Cautions, which are
annunciated for traffic in non-normal operational conditions when a conflict is predicted
on the airport surface (RTCA, 2010). SURF-IA also provided Runway Status Indications
(RSI) and Traffic Indications (TI) for traffic in normal operational conditions, consisting
only of runway and/or traffic highlighting on a CDTI with no aural annunciations. The
RSI and TI indications are intended to remind the pilot to verify runway status prior to
proceeding and to increase the flight crews’ situational awareness about particular
relevant traffic that could affect runway safety, but do not require any time critical or
immediate action.
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Table 4
Runway incursion category vs. SURF-IA Alerting
FAA Definition of Serious Runway Incursion
Category A: A serious incident in which a
collision was narrowly avoided
Category B: An incident in which separation
decreases and there is significant potential for a
collision, which may result in time critical
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision

SURF-IA Definition of Alerting
Runway Incursion
Warning alert: Requires immediate
flight crew awareness and immediate
flight crew response
Caution alert: Requires immediate
flight crew awareness and subsequent
flight crew response

Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced
Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323), 2010, and from “Manual on the prevention of
runway incursions” by ICAO, 2007.

The following statistical assumptions for inter-rater reliability were made based
on Cohen (1960): (a) coding of either alerting or non-alerting was mutually exclusive,
independent, and collectively exhaustive; (b) runway incursion incidents were
independent events; and (c) each rater generated a rating without knowledge and without
influence of the other rater’s rating.

Disclaimer
The research presented in this study was solely from the author and does not
represent an official position of the Federal Aviation Administration or the Department of
Transportation. The use of trademarks or names of manufacturers in this study was for
accurate reporting and does not constitute an official endorsement, either expressed or
implied, of such products or manufacturers.
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Definition of Terms
Advisory
Alert
Automatic
Dependent
Surveillance
Broadcast

Category A
Category B
Category C
Category D

Caution
Convergence
False Alert
Fly-over
Indication

Land-over
Missed Alert
Nuisance
Alert
Ownship

Requires flight crew awareness and may require subsequent flight crew
response
A generic term to describe a flight deck annunciation, meant to attract
the attention of, and identify to the flight-crew a non-normal operational
or aircraft system condition.
A function on an aircraft or surface vehicle operating within the surface
movement area that periodically broadcasts its state vector (horizontal
and vertical position, horizontal and vertical velocity) and other
information. ADS-B is automatic because no external stimulus is
required to elicit a transmission. It is dependent because it relies on onboard navigation sources and on-board broadcast transmission systems
to provide surveillance information to other users.
A serious runway incursion incident in which a collision was narrowly
avoided.
A runway incursion incident in which separation decreases and there is
significant potential for a collision, which may result in time critical
corrective/evasive response to avoid a collision.
A runway incursion incident characterized by ample time and/or
distance to avoid a collision.
An incident that meets the definition of runway incursion such as the
incorrect presence of a single vehicle/person/aircraft on the protected
area of a surface designated for the landing and take-off of aircraft but
with no immediate safety consequences.
Requires immediate flight crew awareness and a less urgent subsequent
flight crew response than a Warning alert.
Progressively decreasing distance between ownship and traffic
determined either by position reports, or velocity and directionality
An incorrect or spurious alert caused by failure of the alerting system
including the sensor.
When an aircraft attempts to land on the same runway and aborts the
landing and flies over the traffic.
Identify to the flight crew a normal operational condition that could
become a runway safety hazard. Indications do not actively attract
attention from flight crews but provide enhanced situation relevant
information to facilitate flight crew perception of safety hazards
(Indications are not Alerts).
When an aircraft attempts to land on the same runway and lands over
the traffic.
Condition where an alert is needed but not provided.
An alert generated by a system that is functioning as designed but is
inappropriate or unnecessary for the particular condition.
Vernacular for pilot’s own aircraft.
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Pilot
Deviation
Runway
Excursion
Runway
Incursion
Warning

Actions of a pilot that resulted in a failure to comply with air traffic
control (ATC) clearance and/or instructions.
When an aircraft on the runway surface departs the end (overrun) or the
side (veer-off) of the runway surface during a take-off or landing.
Any occurrence at an aerodrome involving the incorrect presence of an
aircraft, vehicle, or person on the protected area of a surface designated
for the landing and take-off of aircraft.
Requires immediate flight crew awareness and immediate flight crew
response.
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List of Acronyms
AC

Advisory Circular

ACSS

Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems

ADS-B

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast

AFE

Airfield Elevation

ALPA

Air Line Pilots Association

ARC

Aviation Rulemaking Committee

ASDE-X

Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X

ASIAS

Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing

ASRS

Aviation Safety Reporting System

ATC

Air Traffic Control

ATCAM

Airport Traffic Collision Avoidance Model

BI

Bias Index

CAS

Collision Avoidance System

CDTI

Cockpit Display of Traffic Information

CFR

Code of Federal Regulations

CHS

Charleston International Airport

CY

Calendar Year

DAB

Daytona Beach International Airport

DEN

Denver International Airport

DFW

Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport

DO

Document

DVT

Phoenix Deer Valley Airport
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EASA

European Aviation Safety Agency

ERAU

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University

FAA

Federal Aviation Administration

FY

Fiscal Year

FSIMS

Flight Standards Information Management Systems

GA

General Aviation

GBA

Ground-Based Alerting

GFK

Grand Forks International Airport

GPS

Global Positioning System

HPN

White Plains/Westchester County Airport

HQR

Handling Qualities Rating

HWO

Hollywood/North Perry Airport

ICAO

International Civil Aviation Organization

IMC

Instrument Meteorological Conditions

IRB

Institutional Review Board

JFK

New York/John F. Kennedy International Airport

LACM

Low Altitude Conflict Monitor

LAHSO

Land and Hold Short

LOC

Loss of Control

MAC

Mid-Air Collision

MKE

Milwaukee/General Mitchell International Airport

MOPS

Minimum Operational Performance Standards

NAS

National Airspace System
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NASA

National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NextGen

Next Generation Air Transportation System

nm

Nautical Mile

NMAC

Near Mid-Air Collision

NPRM

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

NTSB

National Transportation Safety Board

OE/D/I

Operational Error/Deviation/Incident

PABAK

Prevalence-Adjusted Bias-Adjusted Kappa

PD

Pilot Deviation

PDARS

Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System

PHL

Philadelphia International Airport

PI

Prevalence Index

QMS

Quality Management System

RIAAS

Runway Incursion Advisory and Alerting System

RIPS

Runway Incursion Prevention System

RISC

Runway Incursion Severity Classification

RSA

Runway Safety Area

RSI

Runway Status Indication

RSM

Runway Safety Monitor

RTCA

Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics

RTHRE

Runway Threshold

RVR

Runway Visual Range

SAE

Society of Automotive Engineers
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SC

Special Committee

SEA

Seattle-Tacoma International Airport

SPR

Safety and Performance Interoperability Requirements

SPSS

Statistical Package for the Social Sciences

SSAP

Surface Surveillance Analysis Platform

SURF-IA

Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface
with Indications and Alerts

TCM

Taxi Conflict Monitor

TCAS

Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance System

TI

Traffic Indication

TSAA

Traffic Situation Awareness with Alerts

VMC

Visual Meteorological Conditions

V/PD

Vehicle/Pedestrian Deviation

WAL

Wallops Flight Facility
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CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE
The literature review indicated a gap in the body of knowledge in three areas
relevant to this study as related to SURF-IA model outcomes: assessment of inter-rater
reliability, validity of scenarios, and validity of runway incursion type to determine
SURF-IA outcomes relevant to a cockpit display of traffic information (CDTI). None
of the other studies in the literature review focused exclusively on PD type runway
incursion incidents or serious (Category A and Category B) incidents. This study was
confined to pilot deviations, which were the type of incidents the FAA has proposed to
use as a metric to assess the benefit of SURF-IA. Furthermore, previous SURF-IA
studies that rated outcomes did not provide any measure of inter-rater reliability, and
researchers conducted their analyses primarily based on generalized data from scenarios
said to be representative of actual runway incursion incidents. This study improved on
the reliability and validity of previous studies by measuring inter-rater reliability, and
utilizing detailed video reenactments of actual serious runway incursion incidents
classified and recorded by the FAA in ASIAS. ASIAS is an on-line data and information
sharing repository consisting of 131 databases related to aviation safety and aviation
standards (FAA, 2012e). One of the databases is populated and maintained by the FAA
Office of Runway with data from runway incursion incident reports that have been
categorized for severity in accordance with the RISC model.
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SURF-IA Model Development
SURF-IA flight deck technology for runway incursion alerting was developed in
response to NTSB safety recommendations starting in 1973, and reinforced by the NTSB
in 1990 when the hazard of airport runway incursions was first placed on its list of Most
Wanted Transportation Safety Improvements (NTSB, 2012). Runway incursions have
remained on the list every year since, culminating in the specific NTSB recommendation
to install flight deck technology for runway incursion alerting leading to the development
of SURF-IA as one of the NextGen ADS-B(In) applications.
Require that all 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 91K, 121, and 135 operators
install on their aircraft cockpit moving map displays or an automatic system that
alerts pilots when a takeoff is attempted on a taxiway or a runway other than the
one intended. (NTSB, 2007, p. 94)

SURF-IA for runway incursion alerting on the flight deck required the maturation of the
Global Positioning System (GPS) as an enabling component to provide precise position
and timing information; hence, research in this area is some of the most recent (Young &
Jones, 2001). The literature review in this area focused on the development of the model
for SURF-IA alerting and not for SURF-IA indications.
The concept for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface
with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA) was defined by RTCA Special Committee (SC186) Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) in support of the FAA
implementation of ADS-B technologies to mitigate runway incursions (RTCA, 2010).
The alerting model for SURF-IA was adapted by SC-186 through analysis conducted
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under government contract by the MITRE Corporation. The SURF-IA model was based
on the Runway Safety Monitor (RSM) algorithm initially developed as part of the NASA
Runway Incursion Prevention System (RIPS) research. The genesis of the SURF-IA
model stemmed from NTSB recommendations for the FAA to implement flight deck
technology that provided immediate warnings of probable runway incursions directly to
the flight-crew (Moertl & Nickum, 2008; P. Moertl, personal communication, October 8,
2012; NTSB, 2000, 2007). A runway incursion alert, as defined by RSM, was not
necessarily a warning of an impending collision but rather a means of notifying the pilot
that a hazardous situation on the runway was detected so that evasive action could be
taken to avoid an accident (Green, 2002).
NASA RIPS encompassed three different technologies under the Airport Traffic
Collision Avoidance Monitor (ATCAM): (a) Taxi Conflict Monitor (TCM) for ground
taxi conflicts anywhere in the airport movement and ramp areas; (b) Low Altitude
Conflict Monitor (LACM) for air-to-air conflicts; and (c) Runway Safety Monitor (RSM)
for runway incursion conflicts (Green, Otero, Barker, & Jones, 2009). The first RSM
flight demonstrations were conducted at Dallas-Fort Worth International Airport (DFW)
alongside two other candidate runway incursion alerting models: Runway Incursion
Advisory and Alerting Systems (RIAAS), and Ground-Based Alerting (GBA) system.
All three models considered the operational state of ownship and traffic determined by
the location relative to the runway, speed, track angle, and acceleration. The primary
difference between the RSM model and the other candidate models, which were
subsequently dismissed, was that RSM detection of incursions considered other criteria
such as aircraft position within a three-dimensional virtual protection zone around a
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runway that was being used by the ownship, along with separation, and closure rate
between ownship and conflicting traffic. The other considerations incorporated into the
algorithms for RIAAS and GBA were unique criteria associated with specific scenarios
(Young & Jones, 2001). In the initial demonstration flights at Dallas-Fort Worth
International Airport (DFW) the RSM algorithm alert generation rate was 91%, yielding
four missed alerts and four false alerts, with all flight profiles following generic scenarios
(Jones, Quach, & Young, 2001). Generic scenarios were a subsumed amalgamation of
many different runway incursion incidents; hence, they could not be directly mapped to a
specific actual runway incursion incident recorded in ASIAS.
The DFW test only involved single runway incursion scenarios. Consequently,
the RSM model was enhanced to accommodate crossing runways and intersecting flight
paths, and adjusted to reduce the number of false and missed alerts (Cassell, Evers,
Esche, & Sleep, 2002). In March 2002, a full mission simulation at NASA Langley
Research Center evaluated the enhanced and improved RSM incursion detection
algorithm and associated alerting concepts, while once again only used flight profiles
with generic scenarios (Jones, 2002). In 2004 the revised RSM model was flight tested at
Wallops Flight Facility (WAL) alongside a runway incursion decision algorithm called
PathProx, which like RIAS and GBA used a scenario based alerting scheme (Jones,
2004). The RSM algorithm alert generation rate was 100% with no missed or false
alerts, while the scenario-based PathProx only alerted 41% of the time when an alert was
expected (Jones, 2004). The research concluded that the RSM model would significantly
enhance runway safety, but should be validated with further simulations and flight
demonstrations.
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Following the Wallops flight demonstration, another simulation study by Prinzel
and Jones (2006) tested the RSM utilizing runway incursion scenarios developed by
NASA, which were then categorized by the RISC model as Category A, B, C, or D
through an independent analysis by three raters from the FAA Office of Runway Safety.
Flight demonstrations of the SURF-IA alerting model based on the improved
RSM model were flown in 2009 by Aviation Communication and Surveillance Systems
(ACSS) under contract with the FAA at Philadelphia International Airport (PHL), and
evaluated for technical feasibility and safety effectiveness using six generic alerting
scenarios (ACSS, 2010). This was followed by an additional demonstration flown with
generic scenario profiles by Honeywell in 2010 at Seattle-Tacoma International Airport
(SEA), also under FAA contract, to refine and mature the model prior to incorporation
into the Safety, Performance, and Interoperability Requirements (SPR) document for
SURF-IA (Honeywell, 2010; RTCA 2010).
The literature review indicated that previous research, simulations, and
demonstrations of SURF-IA had all followed the accepted practice of benchmarking
performance of conflict alerting algorithms using generic conflict scenario profiles, and
not data from specific actual runway incursion incidents (Latimer, 2012). Latimer’s
(2012) research on creating a conceptual detection and avoidance model recognized the
value of using actual incidents to examine outcomes of conflict alerting models and even
presented a mix of generic scenarios and actual incidents; however, the study ultimately
only utilized the generic scenarios. An analysis by Moertl, Lascara, Higgins, and Baker
(2012, June) to estimate the safety benefits of SURF-IA based on the minimum RTCA
(2010) SURF-IA requirement utilized data from a set of 24 historical Category A and
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Category B runway incursions from FY 2007 of which 12 were PD type. The runway
incursions were reconstructed from limited available information, and required detailed
assumptions about aircraft movement and timing based on aircraft typical performance
characteristics, such as aircraft velocity and distance travelled down the runway during
take-off/landing, and aircraft speed and altitude during an approach to a landing. The
study considered both indications and alerts, and used three raters who assessed the
effect of SURF-IA on reducing the severity of runway incursion incidents (i.e., Category
A to Category B or Category B to Category C); however, no measures of inter-rater
reliability were presented and the study utilized the FAA definition of runway incursion
prior to it being harmonized with ICAO in 2008. Moertl et al. (2012, June) concluded
that only 33% of the pilot deviation type incidents would have provided either a SURFIA alert or indication. Lascara and Moertl (2012) subsequently developed a software
tool called the Surface Surveillance Analysis Platform (SSAP) to determine, verify, and
validate SURF-IA outputs from historic runway incursions; however, SSAP used outputs
different than required by minimally compliant RTCA (2010) SURF-IA technology.
Only four runway incursion scenarios were analyzed of which only two were from actual
incidents: one operational error (O/E) and one pilot deviation (PD). Both incidents were
classified as Category C runway incursions and one triggered a SURF-IA alert. The
most recent SURF-IA study by Jones et al. (2012) evaluated the SURF-IA algorithm at
various levels of horizontal position accuracy for seven runway incursion scenarios and
did not focus on alerts or PD type incidents. Although some of the analyses used in the
development of SURF-IA utilized expert raters, none reported any measure of inter-rater
reliability.
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Expert Raters and Inter-rater Reliability
There was abundant literature addressing inter-rater reliability with seminal work
by Cohen (1960) and Fleiss (1971), which had been used extensively in a variety of
studies where models were rated by experts. The relevant statistical literature for this
study revolved around the precedent for rating categorical data with two raters and
measuring inter-rater reliability using percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa.
The use of expert raters and measures of inter-rater reliability to validate models
has been used extensively in research, primarily in medicine and social science.
However, there was no de facto requisite number of expert raters, which have ranged
from a minimum of two up to dozens of raters. There was general agreement in the
literature that the various indices of inter-rater reliability each have advantages and
disadvantages; hence, at least two indices should be used to measure inter-rater
consistency. The terms of inter-rater consistency, inter-rater agreement, inter-observer
reliability, inter-judge reliability, and inter-rater reliability have been used
interchangeably in the literature and were considered synonymous for this study.
Based on a review of the relevant literature, it was concluded that percentage
agreement is the simplest measure of inter-rater reliability; however, it does not take into
account the agreement that would be expected by chance alone. Consequently,
percentage agreement is normally augmented by one or more complex measures that
indicate the proportion of agreement beyond that expected by chance, such as Cohen’s
kappa, Cohen’s weighted kappa, or Fleiss kappa, depending on the number of raters and
whether the variables are nominal, ordinal, or continuous. Fleiss’ kappa is a variant of
Cohen’s kappa that works for any constant number of raters assigning categorical ratings
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to a fixed number of items. The simplest use of Cohen’s kappa is where two raters
provided an independent single dichotomous nominal rating for each case, while a
weighted Cohen’s kappa is appropriate for ordinal and continuous ratings to assess the
level of disagreement by attaching greater emphasis to large differences between ratings
than small differences (Sim & Wright, 2005). Kappa (k) indicates the proportion of
agreement beyond what is expected by chance and takes the form of the following
equation:

𝐾=

( 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
1 − 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡

The data for a 2-category (dichotomous) nominal scale are usually displayed on a 2 x 2
contingency table, as presented in Table 5 (Gwet, 2001).

Table 5
Contingency table for runway incursion alerting
Rater 1
Total
Alert
No Alert
Rater 2
Alert
a
b
g1 = a + b
g2 = c + d
No Alert
c
d
Total
f1 = a + c
f2 = b + d
N = f1 + f2
Note: Adapted from “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use, interpretation, and
sample size requirements,” by J. Sim, and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268.

Sim and Wright (2005) recommended the following method to determine kappa.
The frequency of observed agreement is obtained by summing the frequencies of the
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main diagonal cells (a + d). The proportion of observed agreement (P o ) is obtained by
dividing the frequency by the total number of ratings (n). The frequency of chance
agreement for alerting and non-alerting ratings is calculated by multiplying the marginal
totals corresponding to each cell on the main diagonal and dividing by n. The proportion
of expected agreement (P c ) is obtained by summing across chance agreement in these
cells and dividing by n. The values of P c and P o are used to determine k as shown in the
following equations (Cohen, 1960; Sim & Wright, 2005):

P o = (a + d)/n

[

Pc =

(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛

𝑘=

+

] /n

(𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛

(𝑃𝑜 − 𝑃𝑐)
1 − 𝑃𝑐

The range of possible values of kappa is from -1.0 to +1.0, where the latter indicates
perfect agreement by the raters in every case. Zero indicates agreement no better than by
chance, and negative values indicates agreement worse than expected by chance. Green
(1997) suggested that kappas greater than .75 were considered to have a high agreement
beyond chance, values below .40 have a low agreement, and values between .40 and .75
represented a fair to good level of agreement beyond chance alone. Landis and Koch
(1977) had a somewhat more refined scale for standards of strength of agreement for the
kappa coefficient, which appeared to be the most widely accepted in the literature
reviewed for this study (Table 6). The minimally acceptable value of kappa depends on
the context (Laura & William, 1999). Medical studies have defined clinically important
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kappa values ranging from less than .50 to greater than .80 depending on the level of
medical risk, while academic textbooks and statisticians generally recommend a kappa
value of .60 or greater. Some studies have recognized any kappa value above zero, better
than by chance, as minimally acceptable. Overall, the preponderance of authors have
acknowledged that kappa tends to be lower than other measures of inter-rater agreement
since it corrects for chance, and that the kappa divisions for strength of agreement are
arbitrary (Landis & Koch, 1977; Leech, Barret, & Morgan, 2008). This study followed
the guidance from Sim and Wright (2005) for a small sample size of nine cases in a 2rater study, which required a kappa of .90 to be statistically significant (p < .05) for the
dichotomous variable of alerting or non-alerting. The high kappa value of .90 was
consistent with other research involving elevated risk and was considered appropriate
within the context of this study (Laura & William, 1999).

Table 6
Generally accepted standards of agreement for kappa
Kappa Statistic
< 0.0
0.0-0.20
0.21-0.40
0.41-0.60
0.61-0.80
0.81-1.00

Strength of Agreement
Poor
Slight
Fair
Moderate
Substantial
Almost Perfect

Note: Adapted from “The measurement of observer agreement for categorical data coefficient of agreement
for nominal scale,” by J. Landis, and G. Koch, 1977, Biometrics(33)1, 159-174.

The kappa statistic alone is appropriate if the marginal totals for the 2 x 2
contingency table are relatively balanced. However, if a statistical computer program
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such as SPSS is used to calculate kappa when the prevalence of a given response is very
high, the value of kappa may indicate a low level of reliability even when the observed
proportion of agreement is quite high (Cunningham, 2009; Sim & Wright, 2005). For
example, the proportion of observed agreement in Table 7 was 95%; however, the SPSS
calculated kappa was -0.0163, indicating poor agreement according to the Landis and
Koch (1977) generally accepted standards of agreement.

Table 7
Prevalence and bias paradox
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation
Rater B
No Alert
Rater No
Count
95
A
Alert % of Total 95%
Alert Count
1
% of Total 1%
Total
Count
96
% of Total 96%

Alert
4
4%
0
0%
4
4%

Total
99
99%
1
1%
100
100.0%

Note: Adapted from “More than Just the Kappa Coefficient: A Program to Fully Characterize Inter-Rater
Reliability between Two Raters,” by M. Cunningham, 2009, SAS Global Forum,242.

Prevalence is the proportion of agreement on ratings of the attribute, sometimes
called symmetry of agreement. A high prevalence index (PI) indicates a high chance
agreement and leads to reduced kappa values, and vice versa. Bias index (BI) is the
extent to which the raters disagree on the proportion of ratings. When there is a large
bias, kappa is higher than when bias is low or absent. Prevalence index and bias index
have been used to interpret and inform the magnitude of kappa using the following
formulas (Sim & Wright, 2005):
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Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛

In the example from Table 7, the calculated PI of .95 and the BI of .03 accounted for the
misleading low kappa (-.0163), even though there was a 95% observed agreement
(Cunningham, 2009).
Some authors have suggested computing a kappa adjusted for prevalence and bias
(Byrt, Bishop, & Carlin, 1993; Cunningham, 2009; Sim & Wright, 2005). Prevalence is
taken into account by computing the average value of cell a and cell d in Table 5 and
substituting that value into the actual value of those cells. Bias is accommodated by
substituting the average of cells b and c for those actual cell values. The resulting kappa
coefficient is referred to as prevalence-adjusted bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK).
The use of two raters providing nominal ratings and measuring agreement with
the kappa statistic has been previously used in a variety of peer reviewed research and
doctoral dissertations. Kilpikoski et al. (2002) conducted a study where two clinicians
rated low back pain for 39 patients using a dichotomous rating scale. Sim and Wright
(2005) cited another related study in a book by McKenzie (1981) that provided data for
the agreement of two raters for categorical classification of spinal pain. Wrisley (1998)
utilized two raters and kappa statistics to assess the inter-rater reliability for rating the
performance of 30 human subjects completing walking tasks on level surfaces and
climbing stairs. An example of an aviation related study that relied on two raters was a
NASA analysis of airspace violations that categorized the apparent factors and causes
into eight dimensions. The study involved 22 records, which were coded independently
by two raters with only percentage agreement used as a measure of inter-rater reliability
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(Zuschlag, 2005). Another aviation related study utilized two radiologists who
independently rated spine x-rays of F-16 pilots to classify spinal degeneration, with interrater reliability assessed by percentage agreement and Cohen’s kappa (Hendriksen &
Holewijn, 1999).
A multitude of doctoral dissertations have used two raters and inter-rater
reliability measures of percentage agreement and kappa. A university research study by
Mata (1993) assessing the value of chest x-rays as a screening tool for the diagnosis of
skeletal disorders used two physicians as raters with inter-rater reliability measured by
percentage agreement and kappa. D’Amato (2008) rated a sample of 218 dreams of adult
adopted women using two raters, and more recently Arany (2012) used two raters in a
dissertation involving the coding of family mediation agreements.
Sim and Wright (2005) suggested: (a) constructing a confidence interval around
the kappa value obtained using the standard error (SE) of kappa (k) and the z score
corresponding to the desired level of confidence to reflect sampling error; and (b) testing
the significance of kappa against a value that represents a minimum acceptable level of
agreement, rather than against zero, thereby testing whether its plausible values lie above
an acceptable threshold. Sim and Wright (2005) also presented a table with the number
of subjects (incidents) required in a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant kappa
for p ≤ .05 on a dichotomous variable (Table C1).
Notably, Shoukri (2004) asserted that when seeking to detect a kappa ≥ 0.40 on a
dichotomous variable, using more than three raters had little effect on the power of
hypothesis testing or the width of the confidence intervals, and suggested that increasing
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the number of subjects (incidents) was the more effective strategy for maximizing
statistical power.
Metric Validity
Decisions to fund and support new technology in any field (e.g., aviation,
medical, information technology) have hinged on the demonstration of a benefit as
measured by applicable valid metrics (Laupacis, Feeny, Detsky, & Tugwell, 1992).
However, the rapidity in which new technology has developed often results in the
technology outpacing the validity of the metrics used to measure its effectiveness
(Bughin, Shenkan, & Singer, 2009).
The legacy/traditional metrics recorded in ASIAS, such as those for runway
incursions and near mid-air collisions, can be considered operational metrics that can be
used to determine the continued funding and support of new technology after initial
operational introduction into the NAS. However, when new technology is in its infancy
and still in the research and developmental phase, the validity is determined by
engineering metrics, which can also be outdated, invalid, or otherwise not harmonized
with the new technology. Numerous legacy/traditional rating scales have been used as
engineering metrics during the certification of new aircraft technology. One of the most
recognizable is the Handling Qualities Rating (HQR) Scale depicted in Figure 8, which
was first developed in 1966 by Harper and Cooper (1966, 1986). Handling qualities are
those qualities or characteristics of an aircraft that govern the ease and precision with
which a pilot is able to perform a specified task (Cooper & Harper, 1969). The HQR
scale, commonly called the Cooper-Harper scale, is a decision tree that considers task
performance and workload in determining the rating. Task performance is quantitative
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and readily measured as either adequate or desired, for example: (a) maintained runway
centerline within ± 3 feet (adequate); or (b) maintained runway centerline within ± 1 feet
(desired). Workload is subjective and qualitatively assessed on a continuum for pilot
compensation ranging from minimal to intense.

Figure 8. Cooper-Harper handling qualities rating scale. Adapted from “The use of pilot
rating in the evaluation of aircraft handling qualities,” by G.E. Cooper and R. P. Harper,
1969, NASA TN D-153.

The Cooper-Harper definition of pilot workload recognized mental workload to
some extent, but acknowledged that it could not be directly quantified. When developing
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the handling qualities rating scale and initially validating the pilot ratings for workload,
Harper and Cooper (1966) used pilot heart rates, and/or frequency and magnitude of
control inputs as proxies for workload. Hence, the scale focused primarily on the
physical effort expended by the pilot in moving or imposing forces on the mechanical
flight controls during a specified task.
The HQR scale is still in use today for rating aircraft handling qualities, even
though aircraft have evolved from manually operated mechanical flight and engine
controls to fly-by-wire systems with fully automated digital engine controls and
autopilots (Cooper & Harper, 1969; Harper & Cooper, 1986). The consensus in the
literature is that workload is comprised of multiple factors, to include but not limited to
physical, mental, psychological, and environmental. New technology in modern aircraft
has transformed the primary role of the pilot from a direct manipulator of flight controls,
to a systems operator where mental workload far exceeds physical demands from moving
or imposing forces on mechanical flight controls. Hence, the prevalence and influence of
these workload factors in modern aircraft has shifted away from the physical workload of
physical force inputs to mechanical flight controls, demanding changes to the engineering
metrics.
The Royal Aerospace Establishment, NASA, and others recognized the
shortcomings in the Cooper-Harper workload assessment and developed modified and
new scales, such as the Bedford rating scale, Subjective Workload Assessment Technique
(SWAT), and the NASA Task Load Index (TLI) (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Reid &
Nygren, 1988; Roscoe & Ellis, 1990).
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For example, the Bedford scale focused exclusively on pilot workload, measured
by the pilot’s excess capacity to perform other tasks, while the NASA TLX model
considered six factors; mental, physical, temporal demand, performance, effort, and
frustration (Hart & Staveland, 1988; Roscoe & Ellis, 1990). Although there have been
modifications to the workload rating metrics, there has not been a consistent process for
determining when new technology requires modifications to legacy metrics, and what
modifications are necessary to ensure the legacy metrics are valid for the new technology.
The application of this methodology is also evident in non-aviation fields such as
Internet applications where Russell (2009) suggested that “new metrics are needed, in
part because the legacy metrics are outdated but also because the digital world is evolving
at an accelerated speed”. Although Russell (2009), Bughin et al. (2008), and others have
recognized the increasing obsolescence of legacy or traditional metrics in non-aviation
fields, no one has presented a methodology for evaluating and modifying legacy or
traditional metrics for application to new technology in any field.

Summary
As SURF-IA technology is installed in aircraft, the FAA will determine the
effectiveness and benefits based on the change in the actual number and rate of pilot
deviation type runway incursion incidents using the existing FAA data gathering and
reporting process for runway safety statistics, which is based on the RISC model. Hence,
the SURF-IA model should be validated using profiles from specific actual incidents that
have been categorized by the RISC model and recorded in the FAA ASIAS database, as
was performed in this study, instead of a set of generic scenarios as has been previously
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accomplished. This study improved on shortcomings in previous research by using RISC
model outcomes from specific runway incursion incidents recorded by the FAA in
ASIAS to examine the outcomes from the SURF-IA alerting model. The literature
review also indicated precedents in research and academia for utilizing two raters and
measuring inter-rater reliability by percentage agreement and Cohen’s Kappa.
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CHAPTER III
METHODOLOGY
Video reenactments of runway incursion incidents and the associated ASIAS
incident report data were reviewed by two expert raters. Although the raters may have
been familiar with the types of incidents investigated in this study, the focus of the ratings
was on evaluating the SURF-IA alerting outcomes. Thus, any prior familiarity with the
incidents was not expected to influence their ratings of the SURF-IA technology. The
raters applied the baseline minimally compliant implementation of the RTCA/DO-323
SURF-IA model to determine which incidents would have triggered a SURF-IA Warning
or Caution alert. A minimum acceptable PABAK of ≥ 0.90 was used for this study. The
runway incursion incidents were rated on a dichotomous scale that classified the incidents
as either SURF-IA alerting or SURF-IA non-alerting. This research approach of using
expert raters to validate legacy metrics for application to new technology is generalizable
to other fields of study.
Research Approach
The analysis focused on whether runway incursion incidents classified with an
outcome as serious (Category A or B) using the RISC model would trigger a SURF-IA
model outcome to display an alert (Warning or Caution) to the pilot.
The video reenactments and ASIAS runway incursion report narratives were
viewed by two expert raters who were the actual developers of the aircraft states and
alerting outcomes for the SURF-IA model, as defined in Table 8. Both raters are
internationally recognized SURF-IA subject matter experts and have been referenced
extensively in the literature as well as the citations for this study. To avoid any real or
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perceived bias, the raters were selected from non-regulatory government agencies and
independent government contractors, rather than from the FAA, which regulates/reports
runway incursions and certifies new technology; the avionics industry, which profits from
the certification of new technology, or; the airline industry, which is subject to pilot
deviation reports from runway incursions. The minimum requirements for the SURF-IA
alerting model were applied to each incident using the logic adapted from RTCA/DO-323
and the definitions from Table 8 (RTCA, 2010).

Table 8
Definition of aircraft states
Aircraft State
Entering/Crossing
Runway (not lined-up)
Take-off
Approach to runway
After Landing Roll-out
on-runway
Stopped or Taxiing along
runway (lined-up)

Explanation of Aircraft State
Heading > 20º difference from runway heading
From detection of take-off roll to lift-off
Straight path segment toward a runway, 1000 ft. AFE and ≤
3 nm from RTHRE
≥ 40 knots
Heading < 20º difference from runway heading and < 40
knots

Note: Adapted from “Safety, Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced
Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA)” by Radio
Technical Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323], 2010.

In addition to the SURF-IA model limitations mentioned in Chapter II, the model
follows the logic diagram in Figure 9. Commencing from the “Start” arrow in Figure 8
and moving vertically down, the first two blocks represent SURF-IA design limitations
where the logic path leads to the no alert conditions for: (a) wrong runway departure; and
(b) less than 40 knots closure between ownship and traffic. The next block vertically
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down addresses whether or not one of the aircraft is airborne. No SURF-IA alert will be
issued if the airborne traffic is above 1000 feet above field elevation (AFE), more than 3
nm from the runway threshold (RTHRE), or more than 35 seconds from the runway
threshold.

Figure 9. SURF-IA alerting logic. Adapted from “Safety, Performance and
Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on
the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323], 2010.
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The SURF-IA model specifies a symmetric 4 x 4 matrix of ownship/traffic
aircraft states for runway incursions involving intersecting runways (Figure 10). The
four possible aircraft states are: (a) on approach and within 35 seconds of runway
threshold; (b) on approach and within 15 seconds of runway threshold; (c) landing; and
(d) taking off. All paired aircraft states are designed to provide an alerting outcome,
except for two conditions: ownship will not have a SURF-IA alerting outcome during
landing or take-off if the traffic aircraft on approach, and within 35 seconds of the
runway, is trailing behind ownship as shown in blocks C1 and D1 of Figure 10.
However, ownship will provide an alert once the trailing traffic on approach is within 15

TRAFFIC STATE

seconds of the runway threshold, as shown in blocks C2 and D2 of Figure 10.

ON APPROACH
AND WITHIN 35
SECS OF RUNWAY
THRESHOLD
ON APPROACH
AND WITHIN 15
SECS OF RUNWAY
THRESHOLD
LANDING
TAKING OFF

OWNSHIP STATE
A
B
ON
ON APPROACH
APPROACH
AND WITHIN
AND WITHIN
15 SECS OF
35 SECS OF
RUNWAY
RUNWAY
THRESHOLD
THRESHOLD
ALERT (A1)
ALERT (B1)

C
LANDING

D
TAKING
OFF

NO ALERT
(C1)

NO ALERT
(D1)

1

ALERT (A2)

ALERT (B2)

ALERT (C2)

ALERT
(D2)

2

ALERT (A3)

ALERT (B3)

ALERT (C3)

3

ALERT (A4)

ALERT (B4)

ALERT (C4)

ALERT
(D3)
ALERT
(D4)

Figure 10. SURF-IA alerts for intersecting runways. Adapted from “Safety,
Performance and Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic
Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications and Alerts (SURF-IA),”
by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA/DO-323).

4

54
For all other possible two-aircraft states involving intersecting or same runway
scenarios, the SURF-IA model specifies a 5 x 8 matrix of ownship/traffic states. Five
aircraft states are common to ownship and traffic: (a) entering-crossing runway (not
lined up), (b) take-off, (c) approach to runway (≤ 3 nm from runway), (d) alert landing
roll-out on runway, and (e) stopped or taxiing along runway (lined up). Three exclusive
aircraft states for traffic are identified for intersecting runways: (a) approach to
intersecting runway (≤ 3nm from runway), (b) landing rollout intersecting runway, and
(c) take-off on intersecting runway. All of the 25 paired states not involving intersecting
runways are designed to provide a SURF-IA alert, with the following four aircraft state
pairs as exceptions (Figure 11): (a) ownship and traffic simultaneously entering or
crossing the same runway (not lined-up), as shown in block E1; (b) one aircraft entering
or crossing the runway (not lined up) and the other aircraft stopped or taxiing on the same
runway (lined up), as shown in block, I1, and E12; (c) ownship and traffic simultaneously
stopped or taxiing on same runway (not lined-up), as shown in block I12. All of the 15
paired states involving intersecting runways are designed to provide a SURF-IA alert,
except for six aircraft state pairs where ownship is either stopped/taxiing along a runway
(not lined up), or entering-crossing a runway (not lined up) with the traffic aircraft on
approach, landing rollout, or taking off from an intersecting runway, as shown in blocks
E14, E16, E18, I14, I16, and I18 of Figure 11.

Figure 11. SURF-IA alerts for all possible two-aircraft state combinations. Adapted from “Safety, Performance and
Interoperability Requirements Document for Enhanced Traffic Situational Awareness on the Airport Surface with Indications
and Alerts (SURF-IA),” by Radio Technical Commission for Aeronautics [RTCA/DO-323].
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Each incident was dichotomously categorically coded whether or not the incident
would have triggered an alert (Warning or Caution) in accordance with the RTCA (2010)
SURF-IA model. This study did not evaluate the physical location of the SURF-IA
annunciation on the CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional accuracy,
or aircraft deceleration/braking performance. Hence, the raters only rated whether or not
a SURF-IA alert would have been triggered, without considering whether or not a
runway incursion would have been avoided.

Pilot Study. A pilot study (i.e., feasibility study) was conducted to establish the
validity of the instrument and the inter-rater reliability of the raters. The sample for the
pilot study consisted of FAA video reenactments and ASIAS reports from nine serious
runway incursion incidents, which was the minimum required sample size to determine
inter-rater reliability according to the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance. The population
of serious runway incursions incidents, for which video reenactments were developed by
the FAA Office of Runway Safety, consisted of 58 incidents; however, only nine were
PD type. Consequently, the pilot study utilized Operational Error/Deviation/ Incident
(OE/D/I) type incidents and not any of the PD type incidents, which were reserved for the
main study. The SURF-IA software alerting algorithm made no distinction between
aircraft alerting states caused by the actions of a pilot or ATC; hence, OE/D/I incidents
used in the pilot study were considered surrogates for PD type incidents. The pilot study
incidents were validated against a true score, which was expected to be a SURF-IA alert
for all nine incidents based on the outcomes from similar scenarios that alerted during the
ACSS (2010) and Honeywell (2010) SURF-IA flight demonstrations.
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The data from the two raters in the pilot study were consolidated to show a sideby-side comparison, and then used to develop a 2 x 2 contingency table with descriptive
statistics. The pilot study was used to: (a) check that the instructions given to the raters
in Appendix E were comprehensible; (b) verify the raters were skilled in viewing the
video reenactments and associated narratives; (c) ensure the document and video files on
the media storage device provided to the raters were readable; and (d) evaluate the forms,
procedures, and data analysis approach to identify any necessary modifications. The
same raters were used in the pilot study and the main study, as suggested by Thabane et
al. (2010), and van Teijlingen and Hundley (2001). A Human Subjects Protocol
application was submitted to the ERAU Institutional Review Board (IRB) which granted
the study an exemption for both the pilot study and the main study since the research used
existing data and posed no risks to the raters (Appendix A). Pilot studies are often used
to estimate the sample size required for a main study to be statistically significant
(Thabane et al., 2010). However, this study established a sample size of nine cases for
the main study a priori based on the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance. Although pilot
study sample sizes are typically smaller than those for a main study, matching sample
sizes were used to provide the raters familiarity and training with the rater instructions,
instruments, and data collection devices (Hertzog, 2008; Thabane et al., 2010). Both
raters had previously utilized and cited ASIAS reports and the SURF-IA alerting logic in
their own research (Jones et al., 2012; Moertl et al., 2012), hence no additional training
beyond the pilot study was deemed necessary. The identical sample sizes also provided
some insight for the time that would be required for the raters to complete the main study.
The raters were mailed a media storage device with document and video files as listed in

58
Appendix E. The raters were then allowed to rate the nine runway incursion incidents at
a time and place of their convenience, under the condition that they abide by the
provisions of their signed Informed Consent Form (Appendix A), which required an
independent assessment to be completed within four weeks using no other materials.
Both raters reported that they required approximately four hours to rate all nine incidents,
and both returned the data collection sheet (Appendix F) via email within two weeks of
receipt of the rater data package. The data from the pilot study were not merged with the
main study due to modifications that were incorporated into the procedures as a result of
the pilot study. Furthermore, the data for the pilot study consisted of OE/D/I type
incidents that constituted a different sampling frame from the PD type incidents used in
the main study. The pilot study was analyzed to ensure the reason codes matched the
rated outcomes. For example, if a reason code of I12 was selected by the rater from
Figure 10, it should have been recorded in the no alert block of the data collection device
in Table B1. In some cases the raters assigned multiple reason codes as a result of
confusion with some of the definitions, such as when an aircraft was considered to be onrunway or at what speed did an aircraft on the runway transition from a “taxiing” state to
a “take-off” state. Consequently, prior to the main study the raters where provided a
table of definitions for all aircraft states, derived from the SURF-IA RTCA (2010)
requirements document and presented in Table 8.

Design and Procedures. A Human Subjects Protocol Application was approved
by the ERAU IRB, which included an Informed Consent Form for the raters (Appendix
A). Each rater was provided a media storage device with runway incursion reenactment
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videos and document files with narratives from the associated ASIAS runway incursion
reports. The raters reviewed video reenactments of less than five minutes duration each
and read the associated FAA runway incursion report for the incident extracted from the
ASIAS integrated online database of safety data. The SURF-IA alerting logic from
RTCA/DO-323, as shown in Figures 9, 10, and 11, was then followed to determine if the
incident would have triggered an alerting outcome (Warning or Caution) from the SURFIA model. The results for each incident were recorded on a data collection device
(Appendix B). The following instructions were provided to the raters as part of the
Informed Consent Form, along with the additional instructions in Appendix E:
1. Rate 18 runway incursion incidents within four weeks of receipt of a rater
package by mail which will include a media storage device (flash drive) with
videos and document files, as well as paper copies of the documents.
2. This study does not evaluate the location of the SURF-IA annunciation on the
CDTI in the pilot’s field-of-view, navigational positional accuracy, or aircraft
deceleration/braking performance. Hence, the raters should only rate whether or
not a SURF-IA alert would have been triggered, without considering whether or
not a runway incursion would have been avoided.
3. Not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to this investigator
along with a completed rater matrix.
4. Rate the incidents independently without discussion with any other person or
reference to any other information.
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5. You will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a personal
computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view video
files (.swf, .exe, Adobe® Flash® Player, Internet Explorer®).

The SURF-IA logic for this study only considered alerts and did not include or
consider SURF-IA indications. Conflicts were defined as any movement between two
aircraft that potentially could lead to a high speed collision on the runway surface. The
conflict prediction was based on the relative speed and track between the two aircraft
unless ownship was on the surface and the conflicting traffic was airborne on approach,
or when ownship was airborne on approach and the conflicting traffic was intruding on
the runway. In both of the latter cases, which involved one aircraft on the surface and
one airborne aircraft, the alert logic was based on predicted time for the airborne aircraft
on approach to reach the runway threshold (RTHRE). A Caution alert was issued if the
predicted time to conflict was less than 35 seconds. A Warning alert was issued if the
predicted time to conflict was less than 15 seconds (RTCA, 2010). There was no
difference in the expected crew response to a Warning alert or a Caution alert: the
difference between the alerts being solely a matter of urgency (Honeywell, 2010).

Apparatus and Materials. The SURF-IA model, as depicted in Figures 9-11,
represented the minimum recommended output specifications that SURF-IA should
provide. (RTCA, 2010). Reenactment videos of runway incursions along with the
associated ASIAS narrative reports were provided to each rater. Examples of screenshots
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from a runway incursion video reenactment produced by the FAA Office of Runway
Safety and an ASIAS runway incursion incident report are depicted in Appendix D.

Population/Sample
The FAA Office of Runway Safety produced reenactment videos of runway
incursion incidents that were of high interest to the public, FAA, or the NTSB (R.
Motzko, personal communication, July 11, 2012). The database consisted of 58 video
reenactments from runway incursion incidents of all types and categories that occurred
between CY 2005-CY 2012, of which nine were PD type serious (Category A or B)
incidents. The sample set consisted of the entire population of serious pilot deviation
type runway incursion incidents recorded by the FAA Office of Runway Safety in the
ASIAS database, for which video reenactments were produced using actual surveillance
data from the incidents (Table 9).

Table 9
ASIAS reports of pilot deviation type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion
incidents
ASIAS ID
8173

5826

4828

7167

11322

10923

10675

10969

3374

-------

Note: Adapted from ASIAS database website (http://www.asias.faa.gov/)
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An FAA (2002) analysis of 719 PD type runway incursions recorded from FY
1997-FY 2001 indicated that 624 of the incidents (87%) were associated with an aircraft
that entered the runway or crossed the hold short line after acknowledging hold short
instructions, landed over aircraft in position, or landed/departed on a closed/wrong
runway. The FAA FY 2000-FY 2003 Runway Safety Report (2004) identified the
following common errors in PD type runway incursion incidents: (a) pilots read back
controller’s instructions correctly but did not comply with the instructions; (b) pilots
failed to hold short of the runway as instructed and crossed or taxied into position on the
runway; and (c) pilots accepted clearances issued to an aircraft other than their own.
Cardosi, Chase, and Eon (2010) had similar findings in an analysis of 637 PD type
runway incursions reported in FY 2008. Another analysis by RTCA (2010) indicated that
84% of all runway incursions and 75% of the most severe runway incursions involved an
aircraft entering a runway ahead of an aircraft departing or landing.
A more recent study by Joslin, Goodheart, and Tuccio (2011) analyzed 70
Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS) reports and also concluded that the primary
event leading to runway incursion incidents was aircraft entering the runway after being
instructed to hold short. The sample set used for this present study was comprised of nine
incidents involving the common errors reported by Joslin et al. (2011), Cardosi et al.
(2010), and the FAA (2004), which were representative of the most pervasive types of
incidents that would be classified by the RISC model as a serious (Category A or B)
incident.
A minimum sample size of eight was recommended by Sim and Wright (2005)
for a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant kappa (p ≤ .05) for a one-tailed test
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with a null value of .00, kappa to detect of .90, and 80% statistical power. The Sim and
Wright (2005) recommendation was based on Donner and Eliasziw (1992) goodness-offit Chi-square calculations for two raters with a dichotomous outcome. The minimum
sample size was also predicated on a proportion of positive ratings between .10 to .90,
calculated by Sim and Wright (2005) using the notation from Table 5 as follows:

Proportion of positive ratings = (f 1 + g 1 )/2n

Sources of the Data
Two archival sources of data were used: (a) ASIAS reports, and (b) FAA runway
incursion video reenactments. ASIAS data are publically available without need for
permission and were collected and posted on the FAA website http://www.asias.faa.gov/.
FAA runway incursion video reenactments are also periodically posted on the FAA
Office of Runway Safety website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/ runway_safety/videos/),
and publically available without need for permission. The FAA video reenactments were
developed through precise surveillance data from Airport Surface Detection Equipment,
Model X (ASDE-X) and the Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System
(PDARS), along with the narrative information from the ASIAS runway incursion
reports.
The ASDE-X data came from surface movement radar located on the ATC
control tower, multi-lateration sensors, ADS-B sensors, terminal automation system, and
aircraft transponders. By fusing that data from these sources, ASDE-X determined the
position and identification of aircraft on the airport surface as well as aircraft flying
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within five miles of the airport. The Performance Data Analysis and Reporting System,
developed and maintained by the ATAC Corporation for the FAA, is a comprehensive set
of software tools for gathering aviation performance data. PDARS data includes all flight
planning data, speeds, headings, and altitudes along with a dynamic measuring tool built
into the program to monitor the separation distance between selected aircraft. The audio
files for the incidents were time synched with the available ASDE and/or PDARS files
and matched with index points on the video frames. These data from the surveillance
tapes were tied to the audio files, which were what the graphic artists worked with to
match the index points, taking into account aircraft gross weight, initial roll speeds,
acceleration, and deceleration rates during the incident. Drafts of the video were then
sent to the observers of the incident, pilots, companies, and ATC facilities for a
verification of the video reenactment (R. Motzko, personal communication, February 20,
2013).
Archival reports of actual runway incursion incidents were already classified as
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA Office of Runway Safety by applying the legacy
Runway Incursion Severity Classification model. These data, posted on the FAA ASIAS
on-line database, were extracted and matched with the entire population of video
reenactments of PD type incidents that were produced by the FAA Office of Runway
Safety. Neither the FAA nor the NTSB considers the video reenactments to be part of
any official investigation or official report.
Event summaries and airport diagrams showing the aircraft states for each of the
nine PD type serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents are provided in
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Figures 12 through20). The complete detailed ASIAS reports for the runway incursions,
as extracted from the ASIAS on-line database, were provided to the raters.
Event 1 (ASIAS ID 8173): An airplane was instructed by ATC to hold short of
Runway 33 on Taxiway F. The clearance was read back correctly; however, the taxiing
airplane did not hold short and entered Runway 33, thereby conflicting with another
aircraft on take-off from Runway 33 (Figure 12).

Traffic
Ownship

Figure 12. Event 1 (ASIAS ID 8173) with CHS airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)
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Event 2 (ASIAS ID 5826): An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi and hold
short of Runway 7L at Taxiway N5; however, the airplane did not hold short and entered
Runway 7L without clearance, thereby conflicting with an aircraft on take-off from the
same runway (Figure 13).

Figure 13. Event 2 (ASIAS ID 5826) with DAB airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 3 (ASIAS ID 4828): An airplane pilot was instructed by ATC to taxi from
the ramp to Taxiway M; however, the pilot missed the left turn to Taxiway M and entered
Runway 35L, thinking it was Taxiway M. The aircraft then proceeded to taxi on the
active runway without clearance. Another airplane approximately one-half mile from the
runway threshold on an approach to Runway 35L saw the airplane on the runway and
executed a go-around to avoid a high speed ground collision upon landing (Figure 14).
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Figure 14. Event 3 (ASIAS ID 4828) with DEN airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 4 (ASIAS ID 7167): An airplane, holding short of Runway 7R at Taxiway
B9, erroneously executed the ATC instructions given to another airplane (Call Sign 922
vs. 229), taxied onto Runway 7R without clearance, and was overflown by another
airplane that had just lifted off from the same runway (Figure 15).
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Figure 15. Event 4 (ASIAS ID 7167) with DVT airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 5 (ASIAS ID 11322): An airplane landed on Runway 35L that was
occupied by another aircraft, after being instructed (twice) by ATC to execute a goaround due to insufficient separation from a preceding airplane that was still on the
runway performing a stop-and-go maneuver (Figure 16).
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Figure 16. Event 5 (ASIAS ID 11322) with GFK airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 6 (ASIAS ID 10923): An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi on
Taxiway L and hold short of Runway 36R. The airplane read back the clearance
correctly but then proceeded to cross Runway 36R/18L without a clearance and was
overflown by an airplane that was taking off from Runway 18L (Figure 17).
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Figure 17. Event 6 (ASIAS ID 10923) with HWO airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 7 (ASIAS ID 10675): A helicopter was instructed to taxi to and hold short
of Runway 16. The pilot read back the hold short clearance correctly but then continued
to air taxi across Runway 16 and overflew an airplane that had just landed on Runway 16
(Figure 18).
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Figure 18. Event 7 (ASIAS ID 10675) with HPN airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 8 (ASIAS ID 10969): An airplane was given taxi instructions for a take-off
on Runway 25L with intermediate instructions to hold short of Runway 19L. The
airplane pilot called ATC ready for take-off, while still holding short of Runway 19L,
which intersected with Runway 25L. ATC issued a take-off clearance for a takeoff on
Runway 25L; however, the airplane initiated its take-off acceleration from Runway 19L,
which was the wrong runway (Figure 19).
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Wrong
Runway

Correct
Runway

Figure 19. Event 8 (ASIAS ID 10969) with MKE airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Event 9 (ASIAS ID 3374): An airplane was instructed by ATC to taxi to Runway
22R via Taxiway H and turn left onto Taxiway B, which parallels Runway 22R.
However, the airplane did not turn left onto Taxiway B as instructed, crossed Runway
22R via taxiway hotel, and was overflown by an airplane departing on Runway 22R
(Figure 20).

73

Figure 20. Event 9 (ASIAS ID 3374) with JFK airport diagram. Adapted from FAA
website (http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/diagrams/)

Data Collection Device
Rating data were collected from each rater for each incident and recorded in a
table with two choices (alert or no alert), and incident number/name/location (Appendix
B). The raters determined a SURF-IA alerting or non-alerting outcome for the aircraft
that was cited with the pilot deviation in the runway incursion incident report. The list of
incidents on the data collection devices were developed based on the entire population of
PD type runway incursion incident video reenactments recorded in the FAA Office of
Runway Safety database.
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Instrument reliability. The data collection form was populated based on the
raters’ evaluation of ASIAS data and FAA Office of Runway Safety runway incursion
video reenactments from archival data that constituted fixed data in the public record.
The reliability of the instrument for the main study was tested in the pilot study and
established a statistically significant (p ≤ .05) inter-rater reliability (k = 1.0) with all cases
alerting for a 100% true score agreement corresponding to a 100% proportion of positive
ratings.

Instrument validity. The raters populated the data collection sheet by
application of the SURF-IA model to nine serious runway incursion incidents already
categorized by the RISC model and archived in the ASIAS database. The SURF-IA
aircraft states for ownship and traffic were tabulated in SURF-IA logic diagrams with
lettered columns and numbered rows (Figures 8, 9, and 10). The raters utilized the video
reenactments and ASIAS report narratives to determine the aircraft state of ownship
(e.g., Column E- entering/crossing runway-not lined up) and traffic (e.g., Row 3- take-off
from same runway) and then followed the row and column intersection to obtain the
reason code for either an alerting or non-alerting outcome (e.g., convergence-reason
code E3).
The SURF-IA model was developed by subject matter experts from a broad range
of aviation disciplines through the internationally recognized Radio Technical
Commission for Aeronautics (RTCA). The RISC model was developed by subject matter
experts from NASA and VOLPE National Transportation Systems Center, and was
internationally recognized and utilized by the FAA and ICAO. The runway incursion
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reenactment videos were developed by the FAA Office of Runway Safety using precise
position and timing data from mature surveillance systems routinely utilized and
recognized by the NTSB for accident and incident reconstruction. All the instruments
used in this study were pre-established by nationally and internationally recognized
organizations (i.e., FAA, ICAO, RTCA) and had face validity. The pilot study discussed
in Chapter 3 was conducted to establish the validity of the instrument.

Treatment of the Data
Statistical analysis was performed using the IBM® Statistical Package for the
Social Sciences (SPSS®) Statistics computer software, and hand calculations where
simplicity allowed. Kappa (k) was computed manually and with SPSS. The manual
computations were adjusted for prevalence and bias to provide a prevalence-adjusted
bias-adjusted kappa to assess inter-rater reliability. The calculation of kappa (k) for the
proportion of agreement beyond what was expected by chance was manually computed
from the data from the contingency table using equations (1a), (1b), and (1c). Prevalence
index and bias index were obtained using equations (1d) and (1e).

P o = (a + d)/n = (9 + 0)/9 = 1
P c =[
𝑘=

(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛

(𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐

+

=

(𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛

(1−1)
1−1

] / n=[

= 1.0

(1a)
(9 𝑥 9)
9

+

(0 𝑥 0)
9

]/9 =1

Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛 = = |9 − 0|/9 = 1
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛 = |0 − 0|/9 = 0

(1b)
(1c)
(1d)
(1e)
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Descriptive statistics. Counts and percentages of runway incursions with an
outcome classified as serious by the RISC model were cross-tabulated with the rater’s
outcome for triggering a Warning or Caution alert from the SURF-IA model. Agreement
between the raters was calculated for all paired ratings as an overall percentage
agreement.

Reliability testing. Inter-rater reliability for the categorical variable of alerting
or non-alerting was used to determine the consistency among raters by overall percentage
agreement and then by Cohen’s kappa statistic to calculate agreement beyond that
expected by chance, as suggested by Leech, Barrett, and Morgan (2008). The magnitude
of kappa was influenced by prevalence of the attribute of SURF-IA alerting for the
runway incursion incidents as well as bias, which is the extent to which the raters
disagree on the proportion of alerting or non-alerting cases. To assist in interpreting
Cohen’s kappa, a prevalence index and a bias index were computed using the formulas
from Sim and Wright (2005), and Byrt, Bishop and Carlin (1993).

Qualitative data. The SURF-IA logic diagrams were annotated with a grid of
ownship and traffic aircraft states that determined a specific reason code for each
incident. A column was provided in the data collection device for the raters to indicate
the reason code that determined whether or not the SURF-IA model alerted. The data
collection device also included a column for rater free-form comments that were used to
further explain the raters’ determination of whether or not the SURF-IA model alerted.
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The quantitative data only identified the aircraft state (e.g., after landing, take-off,
approach) of ownship and traffic aircraft when the outcome of the SURF-IA model was
not validated by matching a SURF-IA alert with a corresponding serious outcome from
the RISC model. The qualitative comments from the free-form column on the data
collection device were supplemented by a follow-up questionnaire (Appendix G) that was
emailed to the raters, who typed in their responses to each question and then returned the
completed document by email. The follow-up questionnaire was used to: (a) explain the
raters’ interpretation of ownship and traffic aircraft states, as defined by the SURF-IA
algorithm, which led to their outcome assessments of either alerting or non-alerting; (b)
identify the factors in the model(s) that influenced the different outcomes; (c) identify
lessons learned; (d) identify other applications that might benefit from the methodology
of using expert raters to validate legacy metrics; and (e) provide recommendations for
modifying one or both of the models to harmonize the outcomes, and validate the SURFIA model.
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CHAPTER IV
RESULTS
The pilot study quantitative and qualitative results were consolidated for a sideby-side comparison, as depicted in Appendix F, and used to develop a 2 x 2 contingency
table with descriptive statistics. The results from the pilot study identified modifications
to the methodology that were incorporated into the main study. The rater data from the
main study were consolidated in a similar manner (Appendix F). The descriptive
statistics and reliability testing were in agreement in both the pilot study and the main
study, which when analyzed in conjunction with the qualitative data, identified specific
alerting and non-alerting aircraft states.

Pilot Study
In the pilot study there was 100% agreement between the two raters for the
OE/D/I type serious runway incursion incidents that triggered a Warning or Caution alert
from the SURF-IA model (Table 10).

Table 10
Pilot study rater cross-tabulation
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation
Rater B
Alert Total
Rater Alert Count
9
9
A
% of Total 100.0% 100.0%
Total
Count
9
9
% of Total 100.0% 100.0%
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The calculation of kappa (k) for the proportion of agreement beyond what was
expected by chance resulted in a kappa (k) of 1.0, as shown in equations 2a, 2b, and 2c,
indicating perfect inter-rater reliability (Table 11).

P o = (a + d)/n = (9 + 0)/9 = 1
P c =[
𝑘=

(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛

(𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐

+

=

(𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛

(1−1)
1−1

] / n=[

= 1.0

(2a)
(9 𝑥 9)
9

+

(0 𝑥 0)
9

]/9 =1

(2b)
(2c)

A prevalence index of 1.0 and bias index of 0.0 informed the Kappa value,
yielding a PABAK of 1.0 (Table 12). The kappa value for the main study was not
computed using SPSS due to the expected misleadingly low kappa, which would have
resulted from the influence of the high prevalence index and low bias index
(Cunningham, 2009).

Table 11
Contingency table for pilot study of runway incursion alerting
Rater A

Rater B

Alert
No Alert
Total

Alert
a =9
c =0
f1 = a + c = 9

No Alert
b=0
d=0
f2 = b + d = 0

Total
g1 = a + b = 9
g2 = c + d = 0
N = f1 + f2 = 9
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Table 12
Prevalence and bias adjusted contingency table for pilot study. (Prevalence-adjusted
bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) of 1.0)
Rater A

Rater B

Alert
No Alert
Total

Alert
5
0
f1 = a + c = 5

No Alert
0
4
f2 = b + d = 4

Total
g1 = a + b = 5
g2 = c + d = 4
N = f1 + f2 = 9

Although both raters agreed that all nine incidents considered in the pilot study
would have triggered a SURF-IA alert, the reason codes were only identical in four of the
nine cases. The raters’ free-form comments provided insight into the explanation behind
the differences for the other five cases, which after analysis were determined to be
equivalent (Table C2). Specifically, the definition for the aircraft states for landing
rollout versus taxing on-runway (lined-up) accounted for the different reason codes
selected for Case 1 (F12 v. F10), and Case 3 (G13 v. G10). The reason code differences
(A2 v. A1) for Case 5 was attributed to the raters’ temporal assessment of the aircraft
time to cross the runway threshold (RTHRE) during an approach; Warning alert if ≤ 15
seconds to RTHRE, or a Caution alert if ≤ 35 seconds to RTHRE. Although the raters
selected different reason codes for Case 6 (C4 v. F16) and Case 9 (D4 v. F18), an
examination of the SURF-IA logic diagrams derived from RTCA (2010) indicated that
the aircraft state codes for intersecting runways were redundant, hence, interchangeable.
One rater provided successive SURF-IA alerting reason codes for Cases 3, 5, and 8 as the
incidents progressed from a Caution to a Warning alert condition or from a landing
rollout to a taxiing on-runway (lined-up) aircraft state.
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Based on the results of the pilot study and comments from the raters, the
following modifications to the methodology were identified: (a) clarification of the
difference between a landing rollout aircraft state and a taxiing on-runway (lined-up)
aircraft state; (b) correction of a typographical error in one of the SURF-IA logic
diagrams; and (c) additional instructions for the raters to only provide the reason code
that triggered the first alert. Analysis of the pilot study results established a statistically
significant (p ≤ .05) inter-rater reliability (k = 1.0) with 100% proportion of positive
ratings, which validated the instrument per the Sim and Wright (2005) guidance in Figure
C1, with all cases alerting for a 100% true score agreement. The remainder of the results
presented in this Chapter were from the main study.

Descriptive Statistics
There was 100% agreement between the two raters for the outcomes from the
SURF-IA model for the nine pilot deviation type runway incursion incidents categorized
as serious (Category A or B) by the RISC model (Table 13). Both raters agreed that six
(66.7%) of the nine incidents would have a SURF-IA outcome of an alert, and three
(33.3%) would not have alerted.
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Table 13
Rater cross-tabulation
Rater A * Rater B Cross-tabulation
Rater B
No Alert
Rater No
Count
3
A
Alert % of Total 33.3%
Alert Count
0
% of Total .0%
Total
Count
3
% of Total 33.3%

Alert
0
.0%
6
66.7%
6
66.7%

Total
3
33.3%
6
66.7%
9
100.0%

Reliability Testing
The overall agreement (P o ) was calculated as 1.0 by equation (3a). The
agreement expected by chance alone (P c ) was calculated as .55 using equation (3b). The
calculation of kappa (k) for the proportion of agreement beyond what was expected by
chance was computed with SPSS, as shown in Table 14, and then manually computed
from the data in the contingency table using equation (3c) (Table 15). Both calculations
resulted in a kappa of 1.0. The calculated value of kappa can range from -1.0 to +1.0;
however, for practical purposes only the range from 0.0 to 1.0 is of interest, where zero
indicates no agreement beyond chance and 1.0 indicates perfect agreement. The standard
error (SE) and the confidence interval for the 2 x 2 contingency table were manually
calculated using equations (3d) and (3e), as suggested by Kundel and Polansky (2003),
and yielded a value of zero, which agreed with the SPSS calculated SE value in Table 14.
The kappa for this study was 1.0, with a corresponding SE of zero and a confidence
interval of zero. A prevalence index of .33 and bias index of 0.0 were obtained using
equations (3f) and (3g) to characterize the kappa value, yielding a prevalence-adjusted
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bias-adjusted kappa (PABAK) of 1.0 indicating complete agreement between the raters
(Table 16).

Table 14
Symmetric measures
Approx.
Value Std. Error
Sig.
1.000
.000
.003
a

Measure of
Kappa
Agreement
N of Valid Cases

9

Table 15
Contingency table for runway incursion alerting

Rater B

Rater A
Alert
No Alert
a =6
b=0
c =0
d=3
f1 = a + c = 6
f2 = b + d = 3

Alert
No Alert
Total

P o = (a + d)/n = (6 + 3)/9 = 1

[

Pc =

𝑘=

(𝑓1 𝑥 𝑔1)
𝑛

(𝑃𝑜−𝑃𝑐)
1−𝑃𝑐

=

+

𝑃𝑜(1−𝑃𝑜)

] / n=[

(𝑓2 𝑥 𝑔2)
𝑛

(1−.55)
1−.55

Total
g1 = a + b = 6
g2 = c + d = 3
N = f1 + f2 = 9

(3a)
(6 𝑥 6)
9

+

= 1.0
1(1−1)

𝑆𝐸~� 𝑛(1−𝑃𝑐)2 = �9(1− .55)2 = 0

CI 95% = k ± 1.96 x SE = 1.0 ± 1.96 x 0 = 0

] / 9 = .55

(3 𝑥 3)
9

(3b)

(3c)
(3d)
(3e)
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Prevalence Index = |𝑎 − 𝑑|/𝑛 = |6 − 3|/9 = .33
Bias Index = |𝑏 − 𝑐|/𝑛 = |0 − 0|/9 = 0

(3f)
(3g)

Table 16
Prevalence and bias adjusted contingency table. (Prevalence-adjusted bias adjusted
kappa (PABAK) of 1.0)
Rater A

Rater B

Alert
No Alert
Total

Alert
5
0
f1 = a + c = 5

No Alert
0
4
f2 = b + d = 4

Total
g1 = a + b = 5
g2 = c + d = 4
N = f1 + f2 = 9

Qualitative Data
Both raters agreed on the reason codes for all nine incidents, of which six were
rated as providing an alerting SURF-IA outcome (Table 17). The free-form comments
provided insight into the explanation for the aircraft states for the three incidents that did
not provide a SURF-IA alert outcome. The factors that precluded a SURF-IA outcome
of a Warning or Caution alert were: (a) SURF-IA model did not alert for a single aircraft
wrong runway departure; (b) SURF-IA model did not alert for helicopter runway
incursions; and (c) SURF-IA model did not alert for ownship entering or crossing the
runway and being overflown by another aircraft taking off on the same runway when the
aircraft on take-off had already lifted off prior to ownship entering the runway (Table
18). All three of the aforementioned factors that precluded a SURF-IA outcome of a
Warning or Caution alert would have been rated as serious by the RISC model.

85
Table 17
Ownship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents with
an alerting SURF-IA outcome
Ownship Aircraft State
Entering/Crossing
Take-off
Approach
Runway (Not Lined < 80 knots to Runway
up)
(≤ 3 nm
from
Runway)
Take-off from
Same Runway

Traffic
Aircraft
State

Entering or
Crossing
Runway (Not
Lined Up)
Stopped or
Taxiing on
Same Runway
(Lined Up)
Approach to
Runway (≤ 3
nm from
Runway

ASIAS ID 5826
ASIAS ID 7167
ASIAS ID 3374

Stopped
or
Taxiing
on Same
Runway
(Lined
Up)

ASIAS ID
8173
ASIAS ID
11322
ASIAS
ID 4828
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Table 18
Ownship/Traffic pairs from serious (Category A or B) runway incursion incidents
without an alerting SURF-IA outcome
ASIAS
Ownship State
ID
10923 Entering/Crossing
Runway
(Not Lined Up)
10675 Entering/Crossing
Runway
(Not Lined Up)
10969 Take-off < 80 knots

Traffic State
Take-off from same
Runway
After Landing Rollout on Runway
Not Applicable

Factor
Traffic lifted off prior to
Ownship entering the
runway
Ownship was a helicopter
Single aircraft wrong
runway departure

A common theme in the raters’ qualitative comments to the follow-up
questionnaire shown in Appendix G was the lack of clear or harmonized definitions for
the aircraft states used in the models for the SURF-IA technology and the legacy RISC
metrics that were used to validate the benefit of the new technology. The aircraft state
definition mentioned by the raters as being most troublesome was on-runway, as
highlighted in Case 6. Both raters indicated that neither the legacy RISC definition of onrunway nor the SURF-IA definition was appropriate. Hence, in this case the raters’
recommendation was not to adopt either model’s definition, but rather develop an entirely
new definition through further study. The raters were emphatic about the criticality of
appropriate and harmonized definitions used in the models. Consequently, a specific step
was included in the step-by-step methodology that was developed by this study for
assessing the validity of legacy/traditional metrics for application to new technology, as
presented in Chapter 5. The raters also suggested that the methodology of using expert
raters, as presented in this study, could be applied in the systems engineering for any new
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technology: (a) during the concept development stage, this could help expert raters
define the desired performance of the system; (b) during engineering development, expert
raters could validate the requirements; and (c) during post implementation, expert ratings
could be used to identify shortcomings and validate the functioning of the system. One
of the delimitations of the study was that the raters only assessed whether or not a SURFIA alert would have been issued, without considering late alerts or nuisance alerts when
assessing the effectiveness of the system. However, both raters commented on the
importance of considering late alerts and nuisance alerts when assessing the
effectiveness of the system. Specifically, one of the raters recommended further analysis
through a longitudinal study involving both normal operations and runway incursion
incidents at multiple airports to assess correct alerting as well as nuisance and late alerts
associated with non-serious (Category C and Category D) runway incursion incidents

To define the actual requirements for an incursion alerting system, a large-scale
validation study with empirical surveillance data from multiple airports and over
extended periods of time needs to be performed to determine the overall system
performance in terms of nuisance and true alerts. Not only runway incursion
events should be considered but especially, normal operations where the system
should not provide alerts. Making design decisions based on single events or
incidents can be misleading because while the system may be optimized for these
events, the overall system that needs to run under a much wider set of conditions
may be operationally unacceptable. (Rater B, 2013)
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This study revealed how different outcomes from the RISC and SURF-IA models
may result in misleading information when using the reduction in runway incursion
incidents classified as serious by the RISC model, as a metric for the benefit of SURF-IA
technology. Expressly, the study revealed that the SURF-IA model did not yield an
outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all runway incursion incidents classified as
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model. There were specific aircraft
states in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an outcome of a Warning or
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or
Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model.
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CHAPTER V
DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Discussion
The raters were in complete agreement that six of the nine serious (Category A or
B) PD type runway incursion incidents would have triggered a SURF-IA alert outcome
and three incidents would not have triggered an alert, resulting in a bias index of 0 and an
overall 100% proportion of rater agreement. The mid-range prevalence index of .33
characterized a balance of alerting and non-alerting ratings, indicating that the 100%
rater agreement attained was not by chance alone, which further supported the kappa
value of 1.0 for perfect inter-rater reliability. The kappa statistic alone without
adjustments for prevalence was appropriate and sufficient to assess inter-rater reliability
for this study because the marginal totals for the 2 x 2 contingency table were relatively
balanced (Cunningham, 2009).
This study, which only considered nine PD type serious (Category A or B)
runway incursion incidents, identified three incidents (33%) with aircraft states that did
not trigger a SURF-IA alerting outcome. Three of the 11 known limitations of the
baseline SURF-IA model presented in Table 3 manifested themselves as factors in the
non-alerting incidents: (a) wrong runway departures, (b) no alert if traffic enters runway
after ownship lift-off from same runway, and (c) helicopter operations. The limitations
of the SURF-IA model were known by RTCA SC-186, which developed the SURF-IA
SPR. However, prior to this study, the validity of using RISC derived runway incursion
statistics to measure SURF-IA effectiveness had not been explicitly identified or
considered.
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Seven of the nine incidents in this study involved the most prevalent aircraft state
for runway incursions, which was when ownship aircraft entered a runway ahead of
traffic aircraft departing or landing. All were rated with a SURF-IA alerting outcome
except for the incident that involved ownship entering the runway after the traffic on
take-off from the same runway had lifted-off; this is a known limitation of the SURF-IA
model where it does not alert for an incident classified as serious by the RISC model.
The two other incidents that were rated with a SURF-IA non-alerting outcome also
involved aircraft states that were known limitations of the SURF-IA model: wrong
runway departures, and helicopter runway incursions. Potential issues and solutions for
the aircraft states outside the capability of the SURF-IA alerting model had been
previously identified by Moertl et al. (2012, June), but they had not been considered in
the context of harmonizing the SURF-IA outcomes with the RISC model.
The on-runway condition for the SURF-IA model only extended the aircraft’s
position to the runway shoulder, while the RISC model on-runway condition extended
past the runway shoulder to the taxiway hold line (Figure 7). A broader SURF-IA
definition of an on-runway aircraft condition/state would provide a SURF-IA alerting
outcome for an ownship aircraft entering a runway occupied by traffic aircraft on takeoff, even though the traffic may lift off prior to ownship actually crossing the runway
shoulder. The SURF-IA definition of on-runway is when the aircraft crosses the runway
shoulder, while the RISC model defines an on-runway condition as anytime the aircraft is
beyond the hold line for the runway (Figure 7).
Single aircraft wrong runway departures were addressed by Moertl et al. (2012,
June) who suggested that an ADS-B transponder could be placed on the approach and
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departure ends of runways that were inactive, closed, or otherwise not in use, as mock
traffic which would trigger a SURF-IA alert for an aircraft departing/arriving on the
wrong runway. The modified SURF-IA model, proposed by Moertl et al. (2012, June),
interpreted a wrong runway departure as traffic on the runway.
A wrong runway departure involving a single aircraft is classified as a serious
runway incursion by the RISC model; however, the SURF-IA model only provides alerts
for incidents involving two aircraft. Hence, all runway incursion incidents from wrong
runway departures, even if the aircraft were SURF-IA equipped, would reflect as an
increase in rate and number of runway incursions. The potentially misleading statistical
analysis of the benefit of SURF-IA for runway incursion data when it fails to alert for
wrong runway departures classified as serious by the RISC model, was estimated by
looking at historical data for the number of wrong runway departures. An FAA (2007,
July) report on U.S. domestic wrong runway departures indicated that from CY 1981-CY
2006 there were 696 incidents or accidents involving wrong runway operations. These
data were collected prior to the FAA adopting the ICAO definition of runway incursions
that added wrong runway departures. From FY 2008-FY 2013 (January), under the
expanded definition of runway incursion, the ASIAS database recorded 23 wrong runway
incidents. All of the aforementioned runway incursions, which involved single aircraft
wrong runway departures with a subsequent loss of separation from another aircraft,
would have been classified by the RISC model as serious. However, none would have
resulted in a SURF-IA alerting outcome because the SURF-IA model does not provide
alerts for incidents involving one aircraft. Hence, these wrong runway departure
incidents would have been interpreted as a failure of the SURF-IA technology.
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The baseline version of SURF-IA was not intended for installation on helicopters;
however, the incorporation of helicopter operations into the SURF-IA model was
addressed by RTCA (2010) as follows:

The performance and safety analysis did not analyze helicopter installations.
Therefore, the assumption excludes this configuration from the scope of the
application. However, due to the similarity of surface operations of helicopters
and airplanes while operating on standard airport surface elements such as
runways and taxiways (helicopters on, or hovering above taxiways, holding short
of runways, taking off and landing on runways, on approach to runways/pad)
helicopters may actually be able to safely operate. However, it is expected that a
simple add-on safety analysis may be able to show that helicopters could safely
operate SURF IA. (RTCA, 2010, p. A-40)

Joslin (2013) identified the following considerations for the SURF-IA helicopter
add-on safety analysis recommended by RTCA (2010) SC-186: (a) air/ground
determination for an airborne helicopter in a hover or hover taxiing; (b) helipads as a
surface identified for take-off/landing, but not located on an actual runway surface; (c)
helicopters entering/crossing runways from areas other than known taxiways; and (d)
helicopters on approach to a runway, but not lined up with the runway centerline.
Runway incursions were not confined to airplanes, and neither the number nor the
rate of helicopter runway incursions has shown any appreciable reduction (Figure 21 and
Figure 22). However, the overall statistics for rates and number of runway incursions, as
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published by the FAA Office of Runway Safety, do not distinguish between airplanes and
helicopters. Hence, the exclusion of valid SURF-IA alerting outcomes in ownship
helicopters may influence the validity of runway incursion statistics, derived from the
RISC model, as a measure of the effectiveness of SURF-IA technology for the reduction

Number of Helicopter Runway Incursions
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Figure 21. Number of helicopter runway incursions FY 2008-FY 2012. Adapted from
http://www.asias.faa.gov/
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Figure 22. Rate of helicopter runway incursions per 10,000 operations, FY 2009-FY
2012. Adapted from https://aspm.faa.gov/tfms/ and ASIAS- http://www.asias.faa.gov/

Whereas the existing literature and previous studies did not define or follow a
formal rigorous and repeatable process for validating metrics, this study developed a
step-by-step methodology that filled the gap for assessing the validity of legacy/
traditional metrics for application to new technology (Table 19).
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Table 19
Step-by-step methodology for validating metrics for new technology
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

8
9
10

11
12

13

Determine the intended function of the new technology. For this study, the
intended function of the new technology was the reduction in serious runway
incursions.
Identify the model for the traditional or legacy metric used to measure the outcome
from the intended function of the new technology. For this study, the RISC model
was the legacy metric used for categorizing the severity of runway incursions.
Identify the model for the new technology (e.g., SURF-IA).
Identify the limitations of the technical capabilities of the new technology (e.g.,
SURF-IA model will not alert for single aircraft wrong runway departures).
Identify any differences in definitions between the models (e.g., on-runway
condition was defined differently in the RISC model versus the SURF-IA model).
Identify expert raters in the field of the new technology.
Gather archival data from actual cases of interest that have already been classified
by the legacy/traditional metric. For this study the cases of interest were pilot
deviation type runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B)
by the RISC model.
Select a sufficient number of cases of interest to establish a statistically significant
sample size.
Have the expert raters apply the model for the new technology (e.g., SURF-IA) to
the cases of interest, and determine the outcome from the new technology (e.g.,
alerting or non-alerting).
Gather qualitative comments from the raters to:
•
explain why or how they determined their rating
•
provide lessons learned
•
identify which cases were most troublesome
•
recommend modifications to the model(s)
Calculate the inter-rater reliability, and descriptive statistics (e.g., percentage
agreement, counts.
Identify the cases and conditions where the outcome from the metric used to
measures the benefit of the new technology does not match the outcome from the
new technology, as assessed by the expert raters. The cases identified in this study
were those where the SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a Warning or
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B)
by the RISC model.
Identify modifications to the model(s) that would harmonize the metrics with the
outcome of the new technology.
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Conclusions
The study answered both research questions. (1) Does the SURF-IA model yield
an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as
serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model? The study revealed that the
SURF-IA model did not yield an outcome of a Warning or Caution alert for all runway
incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC
model. (2) What are the aircraft states in the SURF-IA model that preclude an outcome
of a Warning or Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious
(Category A or Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model? There were specific
aircraft states in the baseline SURF-IA model that precluded an outcome of a Warning or
Caution alert for runway incursion incidents classified as serious (Category A or
Category B) by the FAA/ICAO RISC model: (a) wrong runway departures, (b) traffic
entering the runway after ownship lift-off from same runway, and (c) helicopter
operations. This study also revealed how different outcome severities from the RISC and
SURF-IA models may result in misleading information when using the reduction in
serious runway incursion incidents, classified by the RISC model, as a metric for the
benefit of SURF-IA technology.
In FY 2012 there were 10 serious (Category A or B) pilot deviation type runway
incursions, which was a tenfold increase over the one (1) runway incursion of this type
and category reported in FY 2011. This study used four of the ten incidents recorded in
FY 2012, of which three were rated as non-alerting by the SURF-IA model. If this study
had assumed that all aircraft involved in the FY 2012 incidents had SURF-IA equipment
installed, and then used the change in PD type runway incursions classified as serious by
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the RISC model as a metric to assess the effectiveness and benefit of SURF-IA, at least
three of the ten FY 2012 incidents would not have provided a SURF-IA alert. Hence, the
FY 2012 runway incident data would have been misleading by indicating that the SURFIA model was at best only 70% effective and beneficial in providing an alert to mitigate
the hazard from runway incursions.
However, the three incidents that were non-alerting involved three aircraft states
identified in this study as not providing a SURF-IA alerting outcome for an incident
classified as serious by the RISC model. Even if the SURF-IA model had performed to
design, the best it could have achieved would have been a 70% alerting outcome for
incidents classified as serious by the legacy RISC model metric.
This study demonstrated an innovative method of utilizing expert raters and actual
high-risk incidents to identify the shortcomings of using legacy metrics to measure the
effectiveness of new technology designed to mitigate hazardous incidents. The
expansion of the methodology used in this study to other areas lies in first identifying the
known limitations and capabilities in the actual design of any new technology and then
using expert raters to see if, and how, the outcomes from legacy metrics were affected. If
the model differences yield outcomes that do not match, the design of the new technology
and/or the design of the metric for measuring the benefit of the new technology may need
adjustment. The overall implication from this study is that the implementation of new
technology designed to mitigate a legacy hazard demands a concurrent re-assessment of
the legacy metrics. The methodology is generalizable and can be applied to other highrisk areas, such as medicine, nuclear power plants, and other modes of transportation.
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Recommendations
Prior to the certification of SURF-IA for use on aircraft, it is recommended that
further study with a larger number of PD type runway incursion incidents classified as
serious (Category A or B) by the RISC model is conducted to identify other aircraft
states and associated factors that do not trigger a SURF-IA alerting outcome. It is also
recommended that prior to using the ASIAS runway incursion data as a metric for the
benefit of SURF-IA, the FAA develop a process for identifying and tracking ASIAS
reported PD type serious runway incursion incidents which will not trigger an alerting
outcome in the baseline SURF-IA. Data from the runway incursion incidents for Cases 6,
7, and 8 involving runway aircraft states not designed to trigger an alert by the baseline
SURF-IA model should not be considered when assessing the effectiveness and benefit of
the new SURF-IA technology for reducing runway incursion incidents. However,
consideration should be made to improving the SURF-IA model technical capabilities to
accommodate all possible aircraft states that the RISC model would classify as serious
(Category A or B) runway incursion incidents.
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APPENDIX A
Permission to Conduct Research

Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
Application for IRB Approval
Determination Form
13-144
Principle Investigator: Robert Edward Joslin
Other Investigators:
Project Title: Examination of SURF-IA Alerting Outcomes for Serious Runway
Incursion Incidents
Submission Date: January 8, 2013
Determination Date: January 25, 2013
Review Board Use Only
Initial Reviewer: Teri Vigneau/Bert Boquet
Exempt: X Yes
Approved: X Yes

__ No
___ No

Comments: The purpose of this study will be to compare the outcomes of runway
incursion severity classifications of serious derived from the FAA/ICAO RISC model
and flight-deck alerts from SURF-IA flight deck equipage. The research will utilize
publically available reports and video re-enactments from the FAA Runway Safety
Office and the Aviation Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system. Since
this research is using existing data and there will be no risks to participants it may be
determined to be exempt. [Teri Vigneau 1-10-13]
This protocol is exempt. [Bert Boquet 1-17-13]
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CONSENT FORM
Embry-Riddle Aeronautical University
You are invited to participate in a research study related to runway incursions, which
continue to be a source of risk to air transportation; the issue is well documented by the
FAA, NTSB, ICAO, and other international organizations. You were selected as a
possible rater because you are an aviation professional with experience in flight-deck
technology, and runway incursions. We ask that you read this form and ask any
questions you may have before agreeing to be a rater for this study. The study is being
conducted by Robert E. Joslin, in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Aviation.
STUDY PURPOSE
The purpose of this study will be to compare the outcomes of runway incursion severity
classifications of serious derived from the FAA/ICAO RISC model and flight-deck alerts
from SURF-IA flight-deck equipage. The research will utilize publically available
reports and video re-enactments from the FAA Runway Safety Office and the Aviation
Safety Information Analysis and Sharing (ASIAS) system.
NUMBER OF PEOPLE TAKING PART IN THE STUDY:
If you agree to participate, you will be one of a minimum of 2 raters who will be
participating in this research by rating alerting outcomes from flight-deck equipage for 18
runway incursion incidents.
PROCEDURES FOR THE STUDY:
If you agree to be a rater for this study, you will do the following things:
1. Rate 18 runway incursion incidents within four weeks of receipt of a rater
package by mail which will include a media storage device(flash drive) with
videos and document files, as well as paper copies of the documents.
2. Not reproduce or share any of the items and will return them to this investigator
along with a completed rater matrix (Appendix B).
3. Rate the incidents independently without discussion with any other person or
reference to any other information.
4. You will not be expected to travel to any location but will require a personal
computer with word processing (.doc and .docx) and the ability to view video
files (.swf, .exe, flashplayer, internet explorer).
RISKS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY:
There are no foreseeable risks associated with this project. Your individual identity will
not be included in the research study.
BENEFITS OF TAKING PART IN THE STUDY:
There are no direct benefits for taking part in the study.
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CONFIDENTIALITY
Efforts will be made to keep your personal information confidential. We cannot
guarantee absolute confidentiality. Your personal information may be disclosed if
required by law. Your identity will be held in confidence in reports in which the study
may be published and databases in which results may be stored.
PAYMENT
You will not receive payment for taking part in this study.
CONTACTS FOR QUESTIONS OR PROBLEMS
For questions about the study, contact the principal investigator Robert Joslin at (682)
XXX-XXX.
For questions about your rights as a research participant or to discuss problems,
complaints or concerns about a research study, or to obtain information, contact the
ERAU Senior Grants Analyst,Teri Vigneau, Corsair Hall Room 203C,(386) 226-7179 or
at hollerat@erau.edu.
VOLUNTARY NATURE OF STUDY
Taking part in this study is voluntary. You may choose not to take part or may withdraw
consent and discontinue participation at any time without prejudice. Your decision
whether or not to participate in this study will not affect your current or future relations
with the principal investigator.
SUBJECT'S CONSENT
I acknowledge that I have had the opportunity to obtain additional information regarding
the study and that any questions I have raised have been answered to my full satisfaction.
I have also read and fully understand the consent form and sign it freely and voluntarily.
In consideration of all of the above, I give my consent to participate in this research
study.
I will print a copy of this informed consent document to keep for my records and mail the
original to the investigator. My signature below indicates that I agree to take part in this
study.
First Name:__________________Last Name:___________________Title:________
Organization/Agency Name:_____________________________________________
Tel:______________________Email:____________________________
Signature/Date:____________________________________________
Principal Investigator Signature/Date:__________________________________

Table B1
Pilot study data collection sheet
Date:
Rater Name:
Event #

Airport
ID

Example XYZ

2

SAN

3

FAT

4

CLT

5

ATW

6

SFO

7

TUS

8

HNL

9

UGN

True
Rating
Alert or
No Alert

Additional comments
on reason for rating

Alert
Alert
Alert
Alert
Alert
Alert

APPENDIX B

ABE

Comments

Data Collection Devices

1

Total Time to Complete:
√ Check One Box
Only. Indicate Grid
Reason Code (e.g. E3)
Date of
Ownship SURF-IA SURF-IA
Event
Model & Alert
No Alert
Call Sign
Date
C172
Z1
N333RJ
19-Sep-08 CRJ700
AS7138
16-Jan-08 B737
SW1626
28-Aug-08 CRJ200
SKW69R
29-May-09 CRJ200
JIA390
24-Jul-11
EMB145
BTA6131
26-May-07 ERJ170
RPA4912
2-Jun-06
F-16
Banshee1
14-Aug-09 B767
HAL9
24-Jul-04
C172
N405ES

Alert
Alert
Alert
Alert
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Table B2
Data collection sheet
Date:
Rater Name:
Event #

Airport
ID

Example XYZ
1
CHS
2

DAB

3

DEN

4

DVT

5

GFK

6

HWO

7

HPN

8

MKE

9

JFK

Total Time to Complete:
√ Check One Box
Only. Indicate Grid
Reason Code (e.g. E3)
Date of
Ownship
SURF-IA SURF-IA
Event
Model &
Alert
No Alert
Call Sign
Date
C172
E3
18-Dec-09 CRJ200
AS5510
24-Nov-07 C182
N2438F
5-Jan-07
SW4
LYM4216
18-Jan-09 PA28
Trans922
4-Jun-12
C210
N777JK
29-Feb-12 C172
N64238
4-Dec-11
B407
N408TD
11-Mar-12 C750
FIV702
6-Jul-05
B767
ISRAIR 102

Comments

Additional comments on reason for rating
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APPENDIX C
Tables

Table C1
Number of subjects required in a 2-rater study to detect a statistically significant k (p ≤
.05).

Note: Adapted from Sim, J., & Wright, C. C. (2005). “The kappa statistic in reliability studies: Use,
interpretation, and sample size requirements,” by J. Sim and C.C. Wright, 2005, Journal of the American
Physical Therapy Association, 85(3), 257-268.

Table C2
Pilot study rater reason code equivalencies
Rater A Reason Code Description

Rater B Reason Code Description

Explanation of equivalency

F12-Traffic taxiing on centerline
of same runway

F10-Traffic after landing rollout on
same runway

3
FAT

G13- Traffic after landing rollout
on same runway

G10- Traffic taxiing on centerline of
same runway

5
ATW

A1- Traffic on Approach to same
Runway as Ownship, with ≤ 35
secs to runway threshold

A2- Traffic on Approach to same
Runway as Ownship, with ≤ 15 secs
to runway threshold

6
SFO

C4-Ownship landing and Traffic
taking off from intersecting
runways

F16-Ownship taking off and Traffic
landing from intersecting runways

9
UGN

D4-Traffic and Ownship taking
off from intersecting runways

F18-Ownship and Traffic taking off
on intersecting runways

The aircraft state for an aircraft that has
just landed would be considered landing
rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40
knots at which time the aircraft state
becomes taxiing on-runway (lined up).
The aircraft state for an aircraft that has
just landed would be considered landing
rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40
knots at which time the aircraft state
becomes taxiing on-runway (lined up).
Temporal assessment of the aircraft time
to cross the runway threshold (RTHRE)
during an approach; warning alert if ≤
15 seconds to RTHRE, or a caution alert
if ≤ 35 seconds to RTHRE.
An examination of the SURF-IA logic
diagrams derived from RTCA (2010)
DO-323 indicated that the aircraft state
codes were redundant, hence
interchangeable.
An examination of the SURF-IA logic
diagrams derived from RTCA (2010)
DO-323 indicated that the aircraft state
codes were redundant, hence
interchangeable.
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Event #
Airport
ID
1
ABE

APPENDIX D

Data Collection Devices
Figure D1. Example screen shots from runway incursion video reenactment data. Adapted from FAA RI Database
http://www.faa.gov/airports/runway_safety/videos/
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ASIAS BRIEF REPORT
GENERAL INFORMATION
RUNWWAY SAFETY OFFICE - RUNWAY
INCURSIONS
Event Id:
5826
FAA Event Type:
PD
Event LCL Date:
24-NOV-07
Event LCL Time:
1556
Event State:
FL
RI Category Rank:
A
Airport Id:
DAB
Event Location:
DAYTONA BEACH INTL, FL
Event Lndg/Tkoff Surface: RWY 7L
Aircraft 1 Type:
C182
Aircraft 2 Type:
BE20
Aircraft 1 FAR:
91
Aircraft 2 FAR:
91
Weather Condition:
9 SM SCT 026TCU BKN 055 BKN 100 CALM
Data Source:

ANALYSIS DESCRIPTION
A CESSNA C182 WAS TAXIED TO RUNWAY 7L INTERSECTION N5 FOR
DEPARTURE. THE C182 THEN CROSSED 7L AT N5 WITHOUT CLEARANCE
AND CONFLICTED WITH A BEECH BE20 ON DEPARTURE ROLL 7L FROM
ABEAM P2, APPROXIMATELY 3,000 FEET WEST OF N5. ATCT ADVISED THE
C182 OF THE IMPROPER CROSSING AND THE PILOT MADE A 180 TO EXIT.
THE BE20 CONTINUED DEPARTURE ROLL AND AS IT PASSED N5 AND THE
C182 WAS JUST ABOUT OFF THE RUNWAY. THE BE20 STATED HE WAS
COMMITTED TO DEPART WHEN HE SAW THE C182. THE C182 PILOT SAID
HIS BRAKES STUCK. CLOSEST HORIZONTAL PROXIMITY REPORTED WAS 70
FEET.

END REPORT
Figure D2. ASIAS brief report example.
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APPENDIX E
Instructions to Raters
INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS
The following files are included on the attached flash drive under the folder name “Rater
Package-Pilot Study”. The “ASIAS Brief Report” file is provided to supplement the
video reenactments. After observing each video reenactment and reading the associated
ASIAS report, please rate each event as either alerting or non-alerting following the
SURF-IA logic diagrams, starting with Figure 1. The SURF-IA logic diagrams and a
data collection sheet are provided under the files named “SURF-IA Logic Diagrams”.
and “Data Collection Device” respectively. A sample data entry is provided on the data
collection sheet. Please do not open the folder named “Rater Package-Final Study” until
notified by the researcher. All of the other procedures on the Consent Form apply unless
otherwise stated.
Thank you for your participation!

Figure E1. Instructions to raters (pilot study).
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INSTRUCTIONS TO RATERS
The following files are included on the attached flash drive under the folder name “Rater
Package-Final Study”. The “ASIAS Brief Report” file is provided to supplement the
video reenactments. After observing each video reenactment and reading the associated
ASIAS report, please rate each event as either alerting (with reason code) or non-alerting
following the SURF-IA logic diagrams, starting with Figure 1. The SURF-IA logic
diagrams and a data collection sheet are provided under the files named “SURF-IA Logic
Diagrams” and “Data Collection Device” respectively. A sample data entry is provided
on the data collection sheet. For this study the aircraft state for an aircraft that has just
landed should be considered landing rollout until the groundspeed is ≤ 40 knots at which
time the aircraft states becomes taxiing on runway (lined up). Also a typographical error
was corrected in the last column header for Ownship in the SURF-IA Logic Diagram
(Figure 3) to read lined-up instead of not lined-up. All of the other procedures on the
Consent Form apply unless otherwise stated.
Thank you for your participation!

Figure E2. Instructions to raters.

Table F1
Pilot study rater data
Data Collection Date(s)
January 25, 2013 –February 3, 2013
Event #

Airport
ID

Date of
Event

1

ABE

19-Sep08

2
3

6
7
8

9

CLT
ATW
SFO
TUS
HNL

UGN

Rater
A

Rater
B

Alert

Alert

F12

F10

B737
SW1626

Alert

Alert

F12

F12

28-Aug08

CRJ200
SKW69R

Alert

Alert

G13

G10/H12

29-May09

CRJ200
JIA390

Alert

Alert

F1

F1

24-Jul-11

EMB145
BTA6131

Alert

Alert

A1

A2/B3/C3

26-May07

ERJ170
RPA4912

Alert

Alert

C4

F16

2-Jun-06

F-16
Banshee1

Alert

Alert

E3

E3

14-Aug09

B767
HAL9

Alert
G13

24-Jul-04

C172
N405ES

Alert

16-Jan-08

D4

Comments
Rater A and Rater B

Alert

No comments from raters

Alert

Rater B- Conflict aircraft was stopped prior
to B737 initiating take-off roll

Alert

Rater B- Assumed that the landing state is
defined as > 40 knots, per example in
RTCA/DO-323, page A-16, therefore H12.
Rater A-Cannot determine GS of JIA390
when PC12 enters runway. If GS was >80
kts, no alert would be issued
Rater B-EMB145 would have triggered these
three alert cells consecutively

Alert
Alert
Alert

No comments from raters

Alert

No comments from raters

Alert

Alert

G13/G12/
H12
Alert

Rater B-B767 would receive alert while on
approach (G13, then G12) and also after
touch down (H12)

Alert

No comments from raters

F18

APPENDIX F

5

FAT

Reason Code

True
Score

Rater Data

4

SAN

Ownship
Model &
Call Sign
CRJ700
AS7138

Alert/No Alert
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Table F2
Rater data

Data Collection Date(s)
February 12, 2013 –February 15, 2013
Event #
Arpt
Date of
Ownship
ID
Event
Model &
Call Sign
ASIAS ID
1
CHS
18-Dec-09
CRJ200
AS5510
8173
2
DAB
24-Nov-07 C182
N2438F
5826
3
DEN
5-Jan-07
SW4
LYM421
4828
6
4
DVT
18-Jan-09
PA28
Trans922
7167
5
GFK
4-Jun-12
C210
N777JK
11322
6
HWO 29-Feb-12
C172
N64238
10923
7

HPN

4-Dec-11
10675

8

MKE

11-Mar-12

9

JFK

10969
6-Jul-05

Rater A and Rater B

Alert

Alert

No comments from raters

F1
Alert

F1
Alert

No comments from raters

E3
Alert

E3
Alert

I7,I6

I7, I6

Alert

Alert

E3
Alert

E3
Alert

G13/G12
No Alert

G12
No
Alert

Z4

B407
N408TD

No Alert

C750
FIV702

No Alert

B767
ISRAIR
102

Comments

(2)

Z1
Alert

(1)

No
Alert
(3)

No
Alert
Z1
Alert

Rater A-Alert first due to I7, then later due to I6
Rater B-I7 followed by I6
Rater A-This was close to no alert, looked as if Trans415 lifted off as 922 enters
runway
Rater A- Hard to tell when N777JK within SURF IA approach corridor, if not in
corridor until <15 sec to threshold then G12
Rater A-No alert because departing aircraft lifted off before N64238 crosses hold
line
(1)
Rater B- A basic SURF-IA implementation per DO-323 minimum would not
identify this part of the crossing taxiway as part of the runway because it is
located beyond the runway threshold.
(2)
Rater A- E10 based in information given. Based on DO-323, there would be no
alert on helicopter because SURF IA not approved for operation on helicopters.
(3)
Rater B- A basic SURF-IA implementation per DO-323 minimum would not
have been installed on helicopters as DO-323 did not include safety and
performance requirements for helicopter installations. However, an advanced
SURF-IA installation could have been installed on helicopters. In that case, the
alert would have triggered cell E10.
No comments from raters
No comments from raters
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3374

Alert/No Alert
Reason Code
Rater A
Rater
B
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APPENDIX G
Follow-up Questionnaire for Raters
Follow-up Questionnaire for Raters
Rater
Name:

Date:

Time to
Complete:

Please provide a written response to each of the questions below by typing in your
response immediately below each question and return via email to joslinr@my.erau.edu.
Your Consent Form will extend to this Questionnaire, unless otherwise requested.
1.

In Event 6 with ASIAS ID 10923 you rated the incident as non-alerting because
the traffic aircraft was not in an “on-runway” state, based on the SURF-IA model
definition, until after the aircraft on take-off from the runway had lifted off.
(ASIAS ID 10923 report and video reenactment file are attached for your
reference)
(a) How would you have rated the incident using the RISC model definition of
“on-runway” as depicted in Figure 1 below? Please explain why.
RESPONSE:
(b) How would you define an “off-runway” condition for an aircraft clearing the
running on to a taxiway?
RESPONSE:

2. What, if any, lessons learned did you gain while rating the incidents?
RESPONSE:
3. What other applications, aviation or otherwise, might benefit from using expert
raters to rate the outcomes from new technology?
RESPONSE:
4. What other applications, aviation or otherwise, might benefit from validating their
legacy metrics for assessing the benefits or performance of new technology?
RESPONSE:
5. What scenarios created the most doubt in your response?
RESPONSE:
6. What recommendations would you make for methodologies of future studies
seeking similar expert ratings?
RESPONSE:
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7. What recommendations do you have for modifying one or both of the model(s)
(RISC and/or SURF-IA) to harmonize the outcomes?
RESPONSE:

SURF-IA “On
Runway” point

FAA Order 7050.1A
and RISC Model “On
Runway” point

Figure 1. U.S. Airport Surface Geometry On-runway points. Adapted from “Safety,
performance and interoperability requirements document for enhanced traffic situational
awareness on the airport surface with indications and alerts (SURF-IA),” by RTCA,
2010, “Runway Safety Program,” by FAA, 2010.“Airport Design,” by FAA, 1989.

THANK YOU FOR YOUR CONTRIBUTION TO THIS STUDY
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